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Abstract
This thesis studies the economic development in transition and emerging
economies with focus on three particular economic issues: production efficiency,
physical investment rate and bank lending under bank ownership perspective. The thesis
chooses to study transition and emerging economies because they have undergone many
important reform processes that may be thought of as experiments of different policy
choices which lead to different economic outcomes.
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the
literature on institutional economics and transition economies by confirming the
significant role of institutional quality for efficiency and investment in a panel of
transition economies. Better institutions are associated with higher efficiency levels and
investment rates in transition economies. Given that investment is one of the key
determinants of growth this means good institutions are important for growth in
transition economies. Second, the thesis finds that banks of different ownership respond
in remarkably different ways to monetary policies, which has important implication for
the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. It also finds an asymmetric effect
of monetary policy on bank lending with regard to the monetary conditions: in easy
regime bank lending may not be affected my monetary tightening. This result calls for
duly consideration of the ownership structure of the banking system when monetary
policy and its effect on credit are studied.
In summary, the thesis highlights the importance of institutional settings for
economic development in transition and emerging economies.

i

Acknowledgement

It has been a long journey for me to arrive at the finish of my PhD programme, a
journey I could not have made without assistance and support of many people. First of
all, it would have been impossible for me to do a PhD without the bursary provided by
the Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University. I am really indebted to
the financial assistance and logistic arrangements extended to me by the Department.
Second, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Jan Firdmuc
and Dr. Sumon Bhaumik at the Department. They have been provided me all the
necessary guidance and suggestions without which it would have been impossible for
me to finish this research. Their support goes beyond academic topics, reaching many
practical issues of everyday life. Besides, I am also very grateful to many academic staff
at the Department for comments and suggestions about the researches I presented and
Professor Ali Kutan, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, for his comments on
Chapter 4 of this thesis.
I would also like to thank friends at Brunel and in the UK who have given me
valuable support and encouragement which help me overcome the hardship and
loneliness of a PhD research life. Especially, my thanks go to Dilly Karim, Vurain
Tabvuma, Nguyen Duc Hung, Trinh Anh Duc and Pham Trong Nghia.
Last but not least, I am grateful to all my family and friends in Vietnam who
have given me a lot of support, encouragement and love. I am particularly indebted to
the love, support and sacrifice of my wife. My wife and my son are the reason why I
have been able to finish this intellectual journey.

ii

Contents
Abstract
Acknowledgement

i
ii

Chapter I - Introduction

1

1.

Motivation

1

2.

Structure of the thesis

5

Institution – concept and measures

7

3.

4.

5.

6.

3.1.
3.2.

The concept
Measures

Literature review

12

Methodology

17

Key findings

18

4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.

The institutions-growth relationship
The effect of institutions on investment and efficiency
On the relationship between ownership and bank lending
Institutions and efficiency (chapter II)
Institutions and investment rates (chapter III)
Ownership and bank lending in India (chapter IV)

Chapter II - Institutions and efficiency in transition economies
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

2.

3.

12
14
16

17
18
18

20

Introduction

20

The stochastic frontier analysis and the modelling of efficiency

23

Data

27

2.1.
2.2.
3.1.
3.2.

Stochastic frontier model
Specification of production function and modelling of efficiency
Input-output data
Measures of institutions

23
26

28
29

Empirical results and discussions

34

Chapter conclusion

42

4.1.
4.2.

Baseline estimation
Robustness check: endogeneity of capital and use of factor analysis

Chapter III - Institutional determinants of investment in transition economies
1.

7
9

34
38

44

Introduction

44

Literature review - determinants of investment rate

46

Institutions and investment in transition economies

55

2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
3.1.
3.2.

Institutional factors
Transitional factors
Macroeconomic and financial factors

Institution building in transition economies
Investment in transition economies

46
49
50

55
56

iii

4.

5.

6.

Data and model

57

Results and discussion

63

Chapter conclusion

77

4.1.
4.2.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.

Data
Model and methodology
Baseline results
Results with individual indexes
Results with principal components and factors

Chapter IV- Effects of bank ownership on bank lending - The case of India
1.

57
61

63
66
68

79

Introduction

79

Banking Sector and Monetary Policy in India

83

3.

Data and Methodology

89

4.

Results and discussion

97

5.

Chapter conclusion

2.

2.1.
2.2.

Banking Sector
Monetary Policy

83
86

103

Chapter V - Conclusions

105

APPENDIX

108

1.

Tables

108

2.

Figures

111

Bibliography

114

iv

Chapter I

Introduction

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
1. MOTIVATION
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the
people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property,
in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the
authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in
enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.
Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state
in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of
government.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations

Since Adam Smith, economists have long argued for the market institutions as
pre-conditions for economic growth and prosperity. Though a huge amount of studies
has been conducted on the subject of economic development the results have been
unsatisfactory, or even retrogressive (North, 2000). The reason is that researchers take
for granted the polities, demography and institutions which are essential building blocks
for the existence and functioning of markets. In fact, neither neo-classical nor
endogenous growth theories can explain why many developing countries are falling
behind capital-rich developed countries in terms of growth rate. Differences in factor
endowments cannot explain income gaps between countries though factor endowments
are the foundation of various growth models. To understand how economies evolve to
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different directions with remarkably different outcomes we need to understand
institutions.
In the last two decades the literature on institutions has grown enormously
following the seminal works of North (1981 & 1990) and Williamson (1985).
Especially, with great efforts to quantify institutions by authors and organizations like
Fraser Institution, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Daniel Kaufmann, Rafael La Porta, and others, research on institutions has been
booming. In general, there has been an agreement among researchers that good
institutions have positive effect on economic performance. Institutions are very
important for growth and prosperity because they “provide the incentive structure of an
economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards
growth, stagnation or decline” (North, 1991, p.112). According to institutional
economists, it is the differences in institutions that finally lead to differences in
economic performance across countries. Institutions are even considered more
important than such factors as geography and economic integration. In Rodrik et al.’s
words (2004), “institutions rule”. Institutions affect allocation of resources, the
effectiveness of the use of resource and, as a result, economic growth. The incentive
structure shaped by institutions determines if resources are allocated to production or
rent-seeking activities and how effectively resources are used to produce goods and
services. Poor institutions are found to divert investment, thus limiting accumulation of
capital and growth (Mauro, 1995). Besides, poor institutions are found to reduce
productivity growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Olson et al., 2000; Meon and Weil, 2005).
Therefore, it is not surprising that institutions are found to have a significant effect on
growth even when investment is controlled for (Knack and Keefer, 1995). While
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institutions can be endogenous, rigorous studies have shown that institutions indeed can
explain growth when endogeneity is accounted for (Acemoglu et al., 2001) and at least
some aspects of institutions Granger-cause growth (Dawson, 2003).
Following the collapse of the Socialist System that spanned much of the
Eurasian continent, the world has seen great transformations in the former socialist
countries as they move from a planned economic system to a market-based one. They
all head to a common ultimate objective of a well-functioning market economy but
transition measures taken are very different. While many Eastern European transition
countries have adopted a big-bang approach of various extents, their Asian counterparts
have implemented gradual reform steps. Their economic achievements have been
widely different too. There are countries like China and Vietnam that have achieved
continuous growth at high rates. Others have quickly stabilized their economies and
attained growth after an initial output fall (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech
Republic). In contrast, some of them, especially the former Soviet republics, had to
struggle hard for years before they could get back to the pre-transition level of output.
The experience of transition economies has been a natural economic experiment
that attracted a lot of attention from economic researchers around the world (Blanchard
et al., 1991, McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1994; Aslund et al., 1996;
De Melo et al., 1996; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; Falcetti et al., 2000; etc.). Initially,
researches tended to focus on the reform strategies and the transition literature centred
on the shock therapy vis-à-vis the gradualism debate. On one hand, the proponents of
the shock therapy argued for a quick and simultaneous reform in all socio-economic
areas while the political window of opportunity is still open (Sachs and Woo, 1994;
Woo, 1994). On the other hand, others proposed a more gradualist approach on the
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ground of necessary phasing of reforms, the lower cost to the budget and the lower risk
of macroeconomic instability due to rapid restructuring (McMillan and Naughton, 1992;
Dewatripont and Roland, 1992).

In general, institutions were ignored in the early literature on transition for
different reasons. Institutions were sometimes considered to be less important than other
transition issues (Blanchard et al., 1991) or to take too long to establish so that other
policies would be prioritized (Fischer and Gelb, 1991). Following the poor performance
of East European transition economies in the 1990s researchers turned their attention to
institutions in a search for explanations for the disappointing performance of these
many transition economies and the marked differences in economic outcome between
them (Fidrmuc, 2003; Havrylyshyn and Rooden, 2003; Murrell, 2006; Beck and
Laeven, 2006).
In this context, this thesis attempts to further analyze the role of institutions in
the context of transition economies in three directions as follows:
First, efficiency is one of the mortal weaknesses of the former socialist
countries. For many transition economies factor accumulation was not a big problem
but low efficiency really was. Therefore, the first question this thesis tries to answer is:
how do institutions, in the sense of economic and political freedom, affect efficiency of
transition economies?
Second, investment is one of the key determinants of growth which survives
rigorous sensitivity analysis (Levine and Renelt, 1992). For the transition process to
achieve expected results transition countries need to scrap obsolete capital and replace it
with new investment that is in line with a market-based production system. Different
countries with different institutional quality, business environment and policies should
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attain different investment rates. Thus, the second question this thesis attempts to
provide answers for is: how do economic freedom, political freedom and liberalization
affect investment rates in transition countries?
The third question raised in the thesis is about how differences in property rights
impact behaviour of banks in terms of credit supply. Managers of privately owned and
publicly owned banks, or any other firms, have different incentive structures. Banks of
different ownership also have different clienteles and ability and willingness to enforce
contracts. These differences should have effect on various aspects of banks’ operation,
including lending, and consequently on the economy as a whole. To address this issue,
we focus on a country which, while not strictly undergoing a transformation from
central planning to a market economy, has features very similar to those of transition
countries. Since early 1990s, the Indian economy has been undergoing reforms with
liberalization and privatization measures similar to those observed in the former
socialist countries. In many countries, including transition ones, banks still play the
central role of channelling savings to investment (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001)
and generating financial resources for the transition process. Banks of different
ownership types may act differently in terms of loan supply, which would have different
impacts on the real economy. Understanding behaviours of banks of different ownership
types would help to calibrate more appropriate monetary policies towards a more stable
macroeconomic environment and better access to funding for firms during the transition
process.

2. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic of the thesis and the
motivations of the research. The next section of Chapter I will present the concept and
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measures of institutions that have been used in the literature and in this thesis, followed
by a brief survey of the related literature as a background for the thesis, a section on
research methodologies employed in the analytical chapters and finally a section on the
key findings of the thesis.
Chapter II studies the effect of institutions on efficiency of transition economies.
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is used to estimate efficiency scores for 30 transition
countries and estimate the effect of institutions on efficiency. One problem inherent in
this analysis is the lack of reliable data on capital stock in the transition economies.
Therefore, the perpetual inventory method (PIM) is used to construct capital series used
in the efficiency analysis. Measures of both political and economic institutions are used.
Principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to select indicators that best represent
the underlying institutional indicators for econometrical analysis. Economic and
political freedoms are found to have positive effects on efficiency of transition
economies.
Chapter III analyzes the effect of institutions on investment rates in transition
economies by way of panel data methodology. The chapter centres on a comprehensive
model of investment with a focus on institutional determinants of investment. Measures
of institutions include economic freedom, political freedom and liberalization index.
Principal components of economic freedoms are also employed together with individual
indicators of economic institutions and liberalization. The chapter concludes by
identifying the main factors determining investment rates in transition economies.
Chapter IV is an empirical analysis of effect of ownership on bank lending as a
channel of monetary transmission in India. Since the early 1990s, India has liberalized
its economy substantially and achieved admirable economic growth. The Indian
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banking sector plays a very important role in this success and there have been some
radical reforms with privatization and liberalization measures. In this chapter, a
monetary conditions index (MCI) is used to highlight the asymmetry of the bank
lending with respect to monetary policies. Interactions of bank ownership types, MCI
and monetary policy are used to show the differences in the reaction of each bank type
to changes in monetary policy in terms of lending.
The last chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of the findings and
remarks on institutions and economic development in transition countries.

3. INSTITUTION – CONCEPT AND MEASURES
3.1.

The concept

In the economic literature, there have been several approaches to the question
what institutions are and these are succinctly by Crawford and Ostrom (1995).
According to the authors, there are three approaches to answer the question. One
approach considers institutions as regularities in the behaviour of social agents or
equilibrium outcomes which arise from human interactions on the basis of rational
behaviours. This approach was first pioneered by Friedrich von Hayek and then further
discussed by Schotter (1981) and Riker (1980). Though this approach can depict
regularities in the behaviours of agents that result from shared understandings about the
appropriate actions for a particular situation it does not distinguish the roots of actions
which may be voluntary or imposed and enforced by external forces. The second
approach considers institutions as norms with an assumption that many patterns of
behaviours are based on people’s shared perceptions about what is proper and what is
not in particular contexts. In this view, one needs to go beyond rationality to understand
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human behaviours. The third popular approach views institutions as rules. This
approach has been advanced by various works by Douglas North (1990, 1991), Olivier
E. Williamson (1985), Elinor Ostrom (1986) and Jack Knight (1992). This institutional
theory considers patterns of behaviours as necessary or required actions because noncompliant actions are likely to be sanctioned or rendered ineffective by authorities.
According to Crawford and Ostrom (1995), these three approaches are not
mutually exclusive. They all try to explain social orders on individualistic and
situational foundations. They all point to shared strategies and expectations that
influence behaviours and involve constraints and opportunities. The first two
approaches are very helpful for understanding the evolution and emergence of social
orders or regularities of behaviours that emerge gradually over a long period of time.
They lend themselves mostly to informal institutions which include customs, traditions,
taboos, stigmas, etc.). However, there are social and political changes that quickly bring
about new rules that involve new constraints and opportunities, shaping agents
behaviour accordingly. These rules, constraints and opportunities are often referred to as
formal institutions. Examples of formal institutions include constitutions and laws. This
approach is specially relevant to the discussion about the role of the state in promoting
(or hindering) economic growth and development and relationship between the state and
the market. Therefore, in the context of this study about transition economies where
markets are being built to cater for economic activities that reach far beyond community
boundaries we choose to follow the third approach about institutions to focus on formal
rules, constraints and opportunities. In addition, this approach is also widely adopted
due to the fact that it is much easier to quantify and compare formal institutions with
several dataset on institutional quality available for empirical explorations.
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In this regard, institutions are referred to as “the humanly devised constraints
that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991, p.97). Here,
constraints are referred to as reference framework for actions rather than limitations on
actions. These constraints are created to facilitate (or impede) economic exchanges and
they form the incentive structure of an economy which in turn shapes the direction of
economic change.
In general, this approach to institutions is widely subscribed to. Aron (2000), in
a wide-ranging review of literature on institutions, and Acemoglu et al. (2004), also use
North’s definition. Rodrik (2000), summarising other economists, defines institutions as
“a set of humanly devised behavioural rules that govern and shape the interactions of
human beings, in part by helping them to form expectations of what others will do”
which is the same in nature as the North’s definition.
According to their views, of primary importance to economic performance are
the economic institutions that influence the incentive structure in a society such as the
structure of property rights and the presence and orderly functioning of markets.
Without institutions human actions become very uncertain and economic exchange and
cooperation can be subject to such high costs and risks that markets cannot be
established, exchanges cannot be carried out and production potential cannot be
realized. According to North and other institutional economists, institutions reduce
uncertainty, facilitate economic exchange and thus play a major role in explaining
economic performance across countries.
3.2.

Measures

In the last two decades the literature on institutions has expanded enormously
thanks to great efforts to quantify different aspects of institutions.

The common

9

Chapter I

Introduction

approach to quantify institutions is to measure the level of freedom to conduct
exchanges and protection against arbitrary violation of property rights. Freedom is a
concept that is complementary to “constraints” and “rules” which are central to North’s
and Rodrik’s definitions of institutions. In this direction, several panel databases have
been constructed that enable empirical analysis and comparison across country and over
time. In terms of economic institutions, there are the Economic Freedom Index 1 (the
Fraser Institute Index) available from the Fraser Institute and the Index of Economic
Freedom 2 (the Heritage Foundation Index) which is compiled by the Heritage
Foundation and Wall Street Journal. With regard to political freedom we have the
Freedom Index by the Freedom House 3, the Polity Project data by the Center for
Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy4, George Mason University, and the
Governance Indicators 5 by the World Bank. For transition countries, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) compiles a liberalization index which is
also a measure of institutions since it reflects the level of control of the economy by
private hands transferred from the state in the former socialist countries. These datasets
often entail individual sub-indicators that measure different aspects of economic or
political institutions.
The Fraser Institute Index and Heritage Foundation Index are very similar and
they are highly correlated. For 21 transition countries over 6 years the correlation
coefficient of the two measures is 0.83 (see Chapter 2). However, the Fraser Institute
Index covers only 21 transition countries 6 and before 2000 it was only available for

1

Gwartney et al., 2008.
Holmes et al., 2008.
3
www.freedomhouse.org.
4
Marshall and Jaggers, 2009.
5
Kaufmann et al., 2008.
6
18 Central and Eastern European countries and three East Asian countries.
2
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every five years while the Heritage Foundation Index covers all transition countries
with yearly data starting in 1995. For this reason, the Heritage Foundation Index is used
as an indicator of quality of economic institutions in chapter II and chapter III of this
thesis. The EBRD liberalization index is also used for a smaller panel of transition
countries for which the index is available.
In addition to economic freedom, the Freedom House’s Political Rights (PR)
and Civil Liberties (CL) are also used to analyze the impact of political institutions on
economic performance (chapter II) and investment rates (chapter III). Basically, these
measures of institutions are selected on the basis of coverage and availability for
transition countries.
There have been several criticisms about the existing measures of institutions
and the empirical studies that use aggregate indexes. Concerning the Fraser Institute
Index, according to Berggren (2003), “it should be noted that the components of the
EFI, as well as weighting schemes, have changed in the various editions that have been
published” (pp.194-195). Heckelman and Stroup (2005) also observe that the weights of
the various elements of the aggregate index do not appropriately reflect the magnitude
or even the direction of each individual element’s marginal impact on growth. In fact,
they found that some elements of the EFI had a statistically significant negative impact
on growth. The issue of aggregation can be dealt with by the PCA but it is not without
caveat in the sense that there is no theoretical linkage between the components and the
variables to be explained. In this thesis, together with individual elements of institutions
and simple averages of them, the PCA is also used to link the components with the
dependent variables of interest.
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Another criticism is that these variables are not indicators of institutional quality
because institutions do not change that much. However, there are different types or
layers of institutions. According to Douglas North, there are formal (e.g., rules, laws,
constitutions) and informal (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes
of conduct) institutions. According to Williamson (2000) there are four levels of
institutions. The first level is social imbeddedness which mainly corresponds to
informal constraints and where institutions change very slowly. At higher levels,
institutions include formal rules, polity, judiciary, bureaucracy and governance, which
may be considered as formal institutions. At these levels, institutions can change
relatively quickly in the order of years or tens of years. Indeed, when assessing the
institutional development of transition economies, Murrell (2003) shows that the
transition economies have achieved institutional quality higher than often thought and
the success is due to better formal institutions, not informal ones. Though not fully
indicative of the quality of institutions of all types and levels the current measures of
institutions as listed above are widely viewed as appropriate for empirical analysis of
the effect of institutions on various economic variables. Of course, these measures of
institutions are always subject to some level of subjectivity and imprecision due to the
fact that the concepts of economic and political freedom refer to quality rather than
quantity.

4. LITERATURE REVIEW
4.1.

The institutions-growth relationship

Though the importance of institutions has been highlighted for a very long time
the literature on institution-growth relationship did not really take off until the 1990s.
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The main reason was the lack of data for empirical tests. Another reason is that despite
many models to explain growth differences there were many puzzles when institutions
are not accounted for. Hall and Jones (1999) find that variations in the Solow residuals
among countries can be explained by social infrastructure which includes institutions.
When surveying empirical studies on growth, Easterly and Levine (2001) mention that
it is not factor accumulation that determines the bulk of cross-country growth
differences but something else. De Melo et al. (2001) and Falcetti et al. (2002) observe
that differences in application of standard policies do not explain differences in
economic performance. There must be something else. One of the first attempts to relate
institutions to growth is the paper by Barro (1991) which shows that growth rate is
positively associated with political stability and inversely related to market distortions.
Then, Knack and Keefer (1995) show that the impact of governance on growth remains
significant even when investment is controlled for in growth equations. On the effect of
corruption, Mauro (1995) finds that corruption is negatively associated with investment
and growth. Dawson (1998) finds that free market institutions have positive effects on
growth through total factor productivity directly and investment indirectly. In another
attempt to estimate the effect of institutions, especially democracy, on growth Rodrik
(2000) uses data of 90 countries over the 1970-1989 and finds that a higher level of
democracy is associated with a smaller variance of long-run growth. In the context of
transition economies, Fidrmuc (2003) shows that democracy has positive effect on
growth though its effect on liberalization.
However, there have been doubts about these empirical results on the ground of
measurement of institutions and possible endogeneity of institutions. Concerned with
the measurement of institutions, De Haan and Sturm (2000) construct a new index of
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economic freedom with a new mix of components of the Fraser Institute Economic
Freedom Index and their empirical result shows that the change in the economic
freedom (not the level) is a significant determinant of growth. This result is robust to an
extreme bound analysis and a distributional analysis (for coefficients of institutions). In
response to the question about endogeneity of institutional variables, Acemoglu et al.
(2001) exploit the mortality rates of early European settlers in their colonies as an
instrument for institutions and they find that improvement of institutions (like reducing
expropriation risk) would result in higher per capital income. In a similar attempt,
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use colonial characteristics (legal origin, mortality rate
and population density) as instrument variables for institutional variables (protection of
property rights and contracting institution). Their result shows that property rights
institutions have direct effect on long-run growth, investment and financial development
while contracting institutions seem to affect only financial intermediation. To produce a
clear-cut result on the relationship between institutions and growth, Dawson (2003)
tests for a Granger causal relationship between the two variables and shows that some
aspects of economic freedom Granger-cause growth while some others are Grangercaused by growth or jointly determined with growth. Generally speaking, there seems to
be a consensus among researchers of the field that institutions of high quality are
definitely good for economic growth.
4.2.

The effect of institutions on investment and efficiency

Concerning efficiency the most notable work is Adkins et al. (2002) who use a
panel of more than 70 countries over the period 1975-1990 and stochastic frontier
analysis to show that increase in economic freedom (Fraser Institute Index) leads to
higher efficiency. In an attempt to test the relationship between governance, as reported
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in Kaufmann et al. (1999), and technical efficiency, Meon and Weill (2005) find that for
a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance, especially government efficiency, is
associated with greater technical efficiency. Though literature on transition has
expanded to a great extent and the transition process has been going on for almost two
decades the efficiency of former socialist countries has not been studied properly,
especially with effect of institutions. Therefore this thesis will try to add to the literature
in this direction.
The effect of institutions on investment has received more attention from
researchers. In general, the existing results postulate a positive effect of institutions on
investment. Acemoglu (1995) shows that rent-seeking reduces marginal productivity of
investment and that rent-seeking has increasing return to scale which makes rentseeking relatively more attractive compared to investment in production. Mauro (1995)
shows that corruption hurts both growth and investment. More seriously, corruption
makes investment less efficient. In public sector corruption may shift public investment
away from the most profitable projects to less profitable ones that offer more
opportunities for corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In addition, bad governance
reduces the incentive to invest in R&D (Meon and Weil, 2005), thus limiting
opportunities to improve efficiency. As a strong evidence for the positive effect of
institutions, Dawson (1998) empirically shows that political and civil liberties stimulate
investment in a cross section of 85 countries. However, works in this field study broad
cross sections or panels of countries that do not cover transition economies. To our best
knowledge, the literature on investment in transition countries is focused on firms’
investment constraints and behaviour (e.g., Budina et al., 2000; Konings et al., 2003;
Mueller and Peev, 2007). None has tried to analyze determinants of investment rates for
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the whole group of transition countries. Another purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap
in literature on transition economies. Since institutions are theoretically proposed and
empirically found to be a very important determinant of growth and development, we
are particularly interested in examining the role of institutions and reform policies in
explaining investment difference among transition economies.
4.3.

On the relationship between ownership and bank lending

According to La Porta et al. (2000), state-ownership of banks is ubiquitous in
much of the world, especially in emerging markets. There are several arguments for and
against state ownership of banks. State ownership of banks can serve a social objective
of allocating funds to projects with high social returns (Stiglitz et al., 1993). Given the
socially desirable objective, however, managers of state-owned banks may not have the
right incentives (Tirole, 1994), thus exerting less effort and allocating resources
inefficiently. In addition, state-owned banks can be used as a tool for politicians to win
support from political followers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) in pursuit of their own
individual interests. Studying lending records of one state-owned bank in India,
Banerjee and Duflo (2001) shows that this bank does not adjust credit limit to optimal
level over time or according to customers’ needs though the needs often change over
time. Micco and Panizza (2006) report that public banks, especially those in developing
countries, play a credit-smoothing role by lending anti-cyclically. However, Bhaumik
and Piesse (2007) find that lending of private banks is more persistent than that of
public banks. Entry of foreign banks also creates different effects on domestic credit
markets. In the context of a Latin American country - Argentina, Berger et al. (2001)
shows that foreign banks disburse less credit to informationally opaque and small firms.
However, also in Argentina, Clarke et al. (2005) shows that increased foreign
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ownership coincides with more lending outside of Buenos Aires. With regard to foreign
bank entry in transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, Haas and Lelyveld
(2005) find that foreign banks help stabilize domestic credit by maintaining credit base
during recession while domestic banks reduce their credit supply. So, there is large
heterogeneity in terms of credit supply by banks of different ownership, depending on
the context of study. India is in a process of privatizing and liberalizing its banking
system in which state-owned banks, domestic banks and foreign banks coexist and
compete on relatively equal terms (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2007). Therefore, India can be
a good case for studying the effect of ownership on bank lending as a channel of
monetary transmission.

5. METHODOLOGY
5.1.

Institutions and efficiency (chapter II)

First, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which was independently
developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck
(1977) is used to measure the efficiency of the economies in question. Another popular
method to measure efficiency is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Although there
has been an on-going debate on which method is superior, the SFA is thought to
outperform the DEA in efficiency study for transition countries where measurement
problem and uncertainty in the economic environment are prevalent (Fries and Taci,
2005). To estimate the effect of institutions on efficiency, stochastic frontier and the
inefficiency function are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood as proposed
by Battese and Coelli (1995). The capital series used in the frontier estimation is
calculated from flows of physical capital by the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM).
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Two indicators of economic institutions are the first two principal components extracted
from the PCA of ten economic freedoms (the Heritage Foundation).
5.2.

Institutions and investment rates (chapter III)

In chapter III panel data methods are used to estimate the effect of institutions on
investment rates of transition economies. A panel model is built on the basis of the
theoretical and empirically tested relationship between institutions and other
explanatory variables and the dependent variable – investment rate. The possible
endogeneity of the explanatory variable is controlled for by tests (similar to the
Hausman test) and use of lagged variables. Both aggregate and individual indicators of
institutions are used to have a broader view about the role of overall institutions and
those of different areas.
5.3.

Ownership and bank lending in India (chapter IV)

Panel data analysis is also used in Chapter IV where the most important
methodological innovation is the use of the interaction of monetary regime type and
ownership type and monetary policy indicator to detect the different effects of monetary
policy on bank lending of different ownership-based bank groups. Lag of monetary
policy variable is used to avoid feedback from dependent variable to independent
variable. Robust fixed effect panel estimation method is applied to obtain coefficients of
interest.

6. KEY FINDINGS
The main finding of chapter II is that higher quality of institutions, both
economic and political, is associated with higher efficiency in transition economies.
This result is robust to different rates of depreciation that are used to estimate the capital
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series for these countries. All else being equal, East Asian transition countries have
higher efficiency than other transition counterparts in Europe and Central Asia. This
chapter also shows that for transition economies the translog production function is
more appropriate for estimating efficiency than the usual Cobb-Douglas production
function.
Chapter III finds that political and economic freedoms significantly determine
investment rates in transition economies. Higher freedoms induce more investment, thus
generating indirect positive effect on growth. However, it is the overall improvement in
economic institutions, not in individual aspects, that matters. The study also shows that
higher level of financial development and savings rate help increase investment in
transition economies.
In chapter IV the empirical analysis shows that banks’ loan supply is
asymmetric in the sense that, for some bank groups (public and foreign-owned), it is
significantly cut down in a tight monetary regime but not so in an easy regime. In
addition, banks of different types respond very differently to monetary policies in
different monetary regimes. In a tight monetary regime, public and foreign banks cut
back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to be
affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of
monetary tightening. In other words, ownership makes a difference in terms of loan
supply by banks for a given monetary policy and monetary condition and the ownership
structure of the banking system plays a role in determining the effectiveness of
monetary policy in an economy that is a process of transition from a public-dominated
system to a more liberalized and competitive system.
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CHAPTER II - INSTITUTIONS AND EFFICIENCY IN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES

1. INTRODUCTION
The significant role of institutions in determining growth has been confirmed in
many studies. Barro (1991) shows that growth rate is positively associated with political
stability and inversely related to a proxy7 of market distortions. Mauro (1995) concludes
that bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and growth. Rodrik’s (2000) study
on 90 countries over 1970-1989 leads to a conclusion that the more democratic a
country is the smaller the variance of its long run growth. In addition, the effect of
institutions on growth is not just to promote capital accumulation as Knack and Keefer
(1995) reveal that it is still significant after controlling for factor accumulation and
policy. This suggests that institutions should be an important determinant of efficiency.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effect of institutions on
efficiency in the context of transition economies. Since the fall of the socialist system,
transition countries have undergone a transformation process from a centrally planned
economy to a market-based economic system. We have observed marked difference in
economic performance of these economies. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, almost
all of transition countries experienced sharp output fall in the early 1990s and then went
through a recovery process with positive growth rates. At the same time in East Asia
China, Vietnam and Cambodia managed to grow at high and steady rates.
While factor accumulation certainly plays an important part in explaining
growth efficiency also matters a lot. In fact, as shown by Easterly and Levine (2001),
productivity rather than factor accumulation explain most of the differences in income
7

The deviation from the sample mean of the purchasing power parity for investment in 1960.
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and growth among countries. For many transition countries the problem is more about
utilizing existing factors efficiently than about accumulating them. We can say that they
have been operating below the production possibility frontier (PPF) and it will take
them a while to get to the level of efficiency attained in advanced economies. Moreover,
due to differences in initial conditions, the speed of transition and socio-economic
settings, we can expect large variation in efficiency level of these countries.
During the transition process, different institutional settings, both political and
economic, have emerged in these countries. As noted in Murrell (2003), institutional
quality in transition economies in general has improved quickly. However, there is a
huge divergence in the levels of institutional development. Kaufmann et al. (2005)
show that countries like Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have institutional quality
that is in many aspects comparable to those of developed countries while other countries
continue to lag far behind. Therefore, the experience of transition countries in terms of
recovering from a disrupted system and building necessary institutions for a market
economy can be viewed as something close to a natural experiment for analyzing the
effect of institutions on growth in general and improvement in efficiency in particular.
Theoretically, there are many channels through which institutions can affect
economic growth and efficiency. Democratic regimes with check and balance
mechanisms are better able to curb corruption and prevent misuse of productive
resources, especially in investment activities involving public funds, which is good for
growth and efficiency. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when
democratic norms and institutions are stronger. In an effort to explain corruption
Treisman (2000) also concludes that democracy reduces corruption though it is well
established democracy rather than recent democratization process that matters (Sung
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(2004) also comes to similar conclusion). Good institutions can encourage accumulation
of physical capital, human capital and technological knowledge and these factors in turn
help improve efficiency. Bevan et al. (2004) finds that development of legal institutions
has positive effect on FDI inflows to transition countries in Europe, which is supposed
to bring in more advanced technologies to local economies and help enhance their
efficiency. In addition, economic freedom is found by Dawson (1998), among others, to
affect growth directly via total factor productivity and indirectly through investment.
Though there have been many studies on the relationship between institutions
and growth, there are very few attempts to relate efficiency to institutions, especially in
the transition context. Monorey and Lovell (1997) compare the efficiency of 17 Western
European market economies and that of 7 Eastern European planned economies. With a
dummy variable to identify planned economies, their research shows that over the
period 1978-1980 the Eastern European planned economies were only about three
fourths as efficient as the Western European market economies. Using a panel of more
than 70 countries over the period 1975-1990, economic freedom measures compiled by
Gwartney et al. (2005) and stochastic frontier analysis, Adkins et al. (2002) show that
increase in economic freedom leads to higher efficiency. However, two measures of
political freedom, namely civil liberties and political rights taken from the Freedom
House Index, are not significant in their model. In an attempt to test the relationship
between governance, as reported in Kaufmann et al. (1999), and technical efficiency,
Meon and Weill (2005) find that for a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance,
especially government efficiency, is associated with greater technical efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research that digs into the
relationship between institution and efficiency in transition economies since the
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collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Perhaps it is because of the lack of data about institutions,
capital and labour in these countries. One of the contributions of this study is to
estimate capital series for these countries from gross investment data using the
Perpetual Inventory Method. Then, following Battese and Coelli (1995), Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) is used to estimate the efficiency and effect of institutions on
efficiency at the same time by maximum likelihood technique.
The next section presents stochastic frontier analysis and the specification of the
production and efficiency functions. It will be followed by description of data in Section
3 and empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 will conclude the chapter.

2. THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS AND THE MODELLING OF
EFFICIENCY

2.1.

Stochastic frontier model

There are several methods to measure efficiency and the most popular two are
the SFA and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Although there has been an ongoing debate on which method is superior the SFA is supposed to outperform the DEA
in efficiency study for transition countries where measurement problem and uncertainty
in the economic environment are prevalent (Fries and Taci, 2005).
The stochastic frontier production function was independently developed by
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Many
researchers have used the model to estimate technical inefficiency for comparing
efficiencies of firms or economies. Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of
observed output over the maximum feasible output (the frontier) given the level of
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inputs. For a panel data analysis with i as producer identifier and t as time period, the
technical efficiency is depicted as:

=
TEit

yit
; TEit ≤ 1
f ( xit ; β ) exp ( vit )

(2.1)

In equation (1), xit is a (1 x k) vector of inputs, β is a (k x 1) vector of
coefficients to be estimated; vit is random error that are assumed to be independently
and identically distributed as N (0, σ v2 ) . The vit is the stochastic element of the
production function that captures random shocks to each producer/country. So the
production frontier model will look like:

yit = f ( xit ; β ) .exp ( vit ) .TEit

(2.2)

Let TE
=
exp(−uit ) and assume that f ( xit ; β ) takes the log-linear Cobb-Douglas
it
form the stochastic production frontier model becomes

ln yit = β o + ∑ β k ln xk ,it + vit − uit

(2.3)

k

In equation (1.3) uit is the measure of inefficiency because the higher the uit the
lower the TEit. Equation (1.3) is a linear regression model with a composite error

ε=
vit − uit where vit is the two-sided stochastic error and uit is the nonnegative
it
inefficiency term. Because TEit ≤ 1 we have uit≥0 and the composite error ε it is
asymmetric. Therefore, OLS estimation cannot provide a consistent estimate of β 0 .
Moreover, OLS cannot provide estimates of uit which are central to efficiency analyses.
In the standard efficiency literature, the frontier equation is estimated by maximum
likelihood techniques with assumptions about distribution of vit and uit and uit are
extracted from the composite error.
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Early attempts (Pitt and Lee, 1981 and Kalirajan and Shand, 1986) to explain
efficiency effects adopt two-stage approach, in which efficiency scores are estimated in
the first stage and then regressed against some explanatory variables in the second.
However, the assumption of identical distribution of uit in the first stage is violated in
the second stage which is usually OLS estimation. Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a
model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier function for panel data.
The stochastic frontier and the inefficiency function are estimated simultaneously by
maximum likelihood. The panel specification of the model is as follows:
yit = xit β + vit − uit

(2.4)

where with i = 1, …, N and t =1, …, T; yit is the logarithm of the output for country i in
period t, xit is a vector of inputs (in log), and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be
estimated. vit is assumed to be i.i.d N(0, σv2) random error and distributed
independently of uit. Technical inefficiency uit is a non-negative random variable
assumed to be independently distributed such that uit is obtained by truncation (at zero)
of the normal distribution N ( zitδ , σ u2 ) . In another word, the technical inefficiency effect
uit is modelled as:
=
uit zitδ + wit

(2.5)

where the random error wit is assumed to follow normal distribution N(0,σ2) truncated at
such a point that uit ≥0; the zit is a vector of explanatory variables associated with
technical inefficiency and δ is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s coefficients is facilitated by
2
Battese and Corra (1977) parameterization, σ=
and γ σ u2 /(σ v2 + σ u2 ) and
σ v2 + σ u2 =

they are estimated by the software Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). σ2 is the sum of variances
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of the stochastic error and the inefficiency term and γ is the ratio of variance of the
inefficiency term over the total variance. If γ is significant we can say that the
inefficiency matters and we can model the inefficiency.
2.2.

Specification of production function and modelling of efficiency

In stochastic frontier analysis, specification of production function is important
because efficiency is measured against an estimated frontier. If the frontier function is
miss-specified the conclusion about the dynamics or determination of efficiency may be
wrong. The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in the literature on
economic growth. However, there have been several studies which test the validity of
the Cobb-Douglas specification. Based on a panel of 82 countries over a 28-year period,
Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that Cobb-Douglas can be rejected in favour of a
more general CES specification. In theory, Cobb-Douglas is not as good as translog
function since translog is a good first order approximation of many different types of
functions with Cobb-Douglas as a special case. In another attempt to examine CobbDouglas specification with the presence of technical inefficiency with the same data set
as the above, Kneller and Stevens (2003) also rejects Cobb-Douglas vis-à-vis the
translog function.
In this chapter, we will also estimate the production frontier with both translog
and Cobb-Douglas technologies. The production frontier equations are:
(i)

Cobb-Douglas: yit = β 0 + β1kit + β 2lit + β3t + vit − uit

(ii)

Translog: yit = β 0 + β1kit + β 2lit + β3 kit 2 + β 4lit 2 + β5 kit lit + β 6t + vit − uit (2.7)

(2.6)

Here, yit is the logarithm of output for country i at time t, k is the logarithm of
capital stock and l is the logarithm of labour. The time trend (t) is added to account for
movement in the frontier (Kneller and Stevens, 2003).
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To examine the effect of institutions on efficiency, the inefficiency term uit is
modelled as a function of the degree of economic freedom as proxied by the Index of
Economic Freedom (IEF), which is developed by the Heritage Foundation, and levels of
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) published by the Freedom House. The
average value of PR and CL is collectively called Freedom House Index (FHI) .To
account for systematic changes of efficiency over time, a time trend is also added to
efficiency effect model. Time trend has been found significant in some efficiency
analyses (see Kneller and Stevens (2003) for example).
Svejnar (2002) observes that the Central and Eastern and European countries
had smaller output declines and could reverse the decline earlier than the countries of
the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, Eastern Asian transition
economies did not suffer from recession and have had high growth rates. It seems there
are regional characteristics that should be picked up by regional dummies. Therefore,
three dummies are generated and added to the efficiency model to account for potential
region-specific effects for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and East Asia (EA) 8. In general, the technical efficiency
function will look like this:
uit =+
δ 0 δ1 IEFit + δ 2 FHI it + δ 3 RDi + δ 4time + wit

(2.8)

with RDi being dummies for CEE, CIS or EA.

3. DATA
This research uses a panel of 28 transition economies over the 1995-2005
period. The selection of countries and time period is mainly on the basis of data
8

CIS countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Latvia, and Lithuania.
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availability. 1995 is the year when the Index of Economic Freedom data was first
available. Two types of data that need detailing are input-output data and measures of
institutions.
3.1.

Input-output data

The growth and efficiency literature usually uses either the World Bank’s
STARS dataset 9 or Summers and Heston’s dataset (Penn World Table). However, these
datasets do not include all transition countries. So for the purpose of this research we
use the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDIs) for output (GDP), gross
investment and labour. Output is total GDP converted to 2000 constant US dollar at
official exchange rate. The data on labour is the total labour force in the relevant
countries.
Since capital stock data are not available for all countries in the sample in any
existing databases, the transition countries’ investment series (gross capital formation)
are used to construct capital series by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method.
According to the method, the capital stock evolves as follows:
K t = I t + (1 − δ ) K t −1 ,

(2.9)

with δ being the depreciation rate of capital.
By rearranging (1.9) we obtain:

K t −1 =

It
,
g +δ

(2.10)

where g is the growth rate of the capital stock which is assumed to be equal the average
of GDP growth rates over the estimation period.

9

It is developed by two World Bank researchers V. Nehru and A. Dhareshwar (1993).
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Selecting the correct depreciation rate δ in calculating capital stocks is very
important. If the rate is too high capital accumulation will be low and productivity
growth will be overestimated and vice versa. In the growth literature one depreciation
rate is often applied across the whole sample of countries, be they developed or
developing countries (4% in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and 7% in Easterly and
Rebelo (1993)). However, depreciation rates applied to developed and developing
countries should be different because investment projects in developing countries are
normally not as efficient as those in developed countries. That is not to mention
corruption which is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed ones.
Bu (2006) estimates depreciation rates from firm level data of some developing
countries and finds them to be much higher than rates used in the above-cited growth
and efficiency analyses. Pritchett (2000) reports that over half of developing countries
in the sample under investigation have negative total factor productivity. One possible
explanation could be the overvaluation of capital which is equivalent to low
depreciation rate. Therefore, in this chapter the capital series are generated with a
depreciation rate δ =10% 10. Unfortunately, we are unable to compare our capital series
with existing ones because they are only available for pre-1990 periods 11 and we do not
have investment series for most of transition countries (all but China and Hungary) to
estimate capital stock for the pre-1990 period.
3.2.

Measures of institutions

Many researchers of institutional economics use the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom Index constructed by James D. Gwartney, Robert A. Lawson and J. R. Clark
10

For robustness check 6% depreciation rate is also used to generate another capital series but the main
estimation results do not change (see Table A.3).
11
1950-1988 in Penn World Table 5.6 (capital series not available in later version) and 1950-1990 in
World Bank dataset.
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(Gwartney et al., 1999). However, this dataset does not cover all transition countries 12
and before 2000 it was only available for every five years. In this study I use the Index
of Economic Freedom data developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street
Journal. In fact, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index and the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom are highly correlated with a coefficient of
0.8 13 for transition countries that have both measures of economic freedom.
The IEF dataset starts from 1995 and is available for all transition countries. The
authors of the Index collect 50 independent economic variables that are categorized into
ten economic freedom factors (IFE factors): trade policy, fiscal burden or government,
government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment,
banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and informal market.
The difference between this data set and others is that the values of the variables are
calculated with data available from various sources 14 which are less subject to
subjective survey data. Each factor is graded from 1 to 5, with a score of 1 representing
an economic environment that is the most conducive to economic freedom. Table 2.1 in
the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of these ten factors. In general the
correlation between them is of a considerable level.
So far, many institution researchers have used the composite indexes such as the
index of governance published by Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors, the Gwartney et
al.’s Economic Freedom Index (Fraser Institute) or the Heritage Foundation’s Index of
Economic Freedom in their empirical researches but there have been doubts about their
consistency and relevance. Berggren (2003) observes that the Gwartney et al.’s index
has different components and is constructed with different weighting schemes from one
12

only 21 transition countries (19 Central and Eastern European countries and two East Asian countries).
Note that for the Fraser Institute’s index, the higher the score the more freedom there is.
14
See Beach and Miles (2006) for details.
13
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year to another. Heckelman and Stroup (2005) suggest that empirical researchers should
use individual economic freedom indicators instead of the aggregate indexes because
misinterpretation may arise with regard to different types of economic freedom.

Table 2.1
Correlations of Indices of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation)
Trade

Fiscal

Gov_int Mon_pol

For_inv

Banking

WP

PROP

REG

Trade

1

Fiscal

0.2402

1

Gov_int

0.4318

0.2383

1

Mon_pol

0.1572

0.2839

0.377

1

For_inv

0.5549

0.2203

0.3653

0.1128

1

Banking

0.5336

0.2719

0.4498

0.374

0.6935

1

WP

0.4637

0.2387

0.4395

0.3724

0.7131

0.7082

1

PROP

0.547

0.142

0.2782

0.0192

0.6907

0.6465

0.5394

1

REG

0.5114

0.1133

0.2802

0.112

0.686

0.6166

0.6133

0.7947

1

INFMKT 0.4629

0.1221

0.3875

0.2779

0.5447

0.5804

0.5393

0.6075

0.53

Note: Trade: trade policy; Fiscal: fiscal policy; Gov_int: government intervention; Mon_pol: monetary
policy; For_inv: capital flows and foreign investment; Banking: banking and finance; WP: wages and
prices; PROP: property rights; REG: regulation; and INF_MKT: informal market

To avoid the above problem of arbitrarily weighted composite index we apply
the Principal Component Analysis to the ten IEF factors and select some principal
components as measures of economic freedom. This technique can help reduce the
dimensionality of the original data while retaining the maximum variation of the
underlying variables. The principal components, by construction, are independent of
each other. The parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average partial correlation
analysis for selecting number of components to be retained indicate that we should use
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two components. As a result, economic institutions will be represented by the first two
principal components (COMP1 and COMP2).

Table 2.2
Principal component loading matrix for Economic Freedom factors
Component
Factor

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Trade policy

0.3173 -0.0304 0.1902 0.5506

0.182 0.6822 -0.2146 0.0856 -0.0844 -0.0016

Fiscal burden

0.1453 0.4527 0.8229 -0.1347 0.1491 -0.2153 0.0245 0.0651 -0.0561 -0.0464

Government
consumption

0.2545 0.3719 -0.2087 0.6592 -0.2696 -0.417 0.2683 -0.0026 0.0164 -0.0014

Monetary policy 0.16

0.6411 -0.3547 -0.3297 0.1732 0.3709 0.2282 0.0794 0.2891 0.1393

Foreign
investment

0.3753 -0.175 0.1129 -0.0826 -0.3349 -0.0709 -0.3159 0.0664 0.7656 -0.0374

Banking and
finance

0.3823 0.0629 -0.0534 -0.1741 -0.1205 0.0638 -0.0823 -0.8241 -0.2062 -0.2641

Wage and policy 0.3663 0.0792 -0.1186 -0.2658 -0.4359 -0.016 -0.3226 0.3825 -0.5186 0.2551
Property rights

0.3599 -0.3411 0.1002 -0.0406 0.2089 -0.0877 0.3841 -0.1672 0.0179 0.7178

Regulation

0.3574 -0.2935 0.0206

Informal market 0.3308 -0.0396

-0.161 -0.0323 0.0851 0.5843 0.3246 -0.0826 -0.5458

-0.278 -0.0093 0.6932 -0.3905

-0.36 0.1376 -0.0329 -0.1703

Cumulative
variance

0.5049 0.6434 0.7264 0.7954 0.8476 0.8931 0.9321 0.9616 0.9838

1

Table 2.2 is the loading matrix of the principal component analysis and the
cumulative variance that is explained by variances of components. It tells us about the
importance of principal individual components how they are related to the underlying
variables. The first component, which by construction has the highest variance, can be
interpreted as a general measure of freedom. The variance of the first component
explains 50.5% of the total variance of the 10 factors. The second component is
positively correlated with fiscal policy, government intervention and monetary policy
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and negatively correlated with foreign investment, property rights and regulation. We
can think of the second component as a contrast between macroeconomic policy and
business-related policy. Higher scores on this component are associated with less
freedom in terms of macroeconomic environment and more freedom in the business
environment. Between the first two components they explain 64.3% of the total
variance of all factors.
Table 2.3
Summary statistics for 28 countries, 1995-2005
Variable

Mean

Standard deviation Minimum Maximum

y

23.29

1.65

20.52

28.26

k

23.76

1.76

20.49

29.03

l

15.32

1.51

13.4

20.47

FHI

3.805195

1.98

1

7

PR

3.75

2.26

1

7

CL

3.86039

1.75

1

7

COMP1

-4.74E-09

2.24695

-5.69

4.74

COMP2

5.13E-10

1.176851

-2.69

2.42

y, k and l are logarithms of output, capital and labour; FHI is the simple average index of Political
Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL); COMP1 and COMP2 are the first two principal components of ten
economic freedom factors.

As for political institutions two measures are widely used in the literature: civil
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR). These measures are published by the Freedom
House which uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and
freedoms enjoyed by individuals. PR and CL are scored from one to seven for each
country in each year with larger number indicating less freedom. PR and CL are highly
correlated (0.94) in this sample. In the actual estimations, a simple average index of
them (FHI) is also used (estimations with PR and CL used separately are reported in the
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Appendix – Table A2.1). Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of variables used to
estimate efficiency and effects of determinants of efficiency.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1.

Baseline estimation

Both Translog and Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated with the
final efficiency model being:
uit =
δ 0 + δ1COMP1it + δ 2COMP 2it + δ 3 FHI it + δ 4 RDi + δ 5time + ε it (1.11)
Regressions are run with one regional dummy separately and with CEE as
control group but only the EA dummy is significant. PR, CL and the simple average of
them (FHI) are used separately in the regressions but there are no qualitative changes.
Changes in terms of coefficients’ magnitude are not substantial. Since uit represents
inefficiency and higher values of institutional variables mean less freedom we expect to
have positive coefficients β1, β2 and β3. Table 2.4 presents the result with FHI as
measure of political freedom, with and without and EA - dummy for East Asia (see
Table A2.1 in the Appendix for results with PR and CL).
In all specifications the likelihood ratio test results show that the coefficients of
the efficiency equation and σ2 and γ are jointly significant. This means the specification
of the model is correct. The significance of the variance parameters σ2 (sum of
variances) and γ (variance of inefficiency term over sum of variances) indicates that
technical efficiency does matter in the production function and that the stochastic
specification is appropriate. With γ being very close to one in all specifications we can
say that variation in technical efficiency is substantial among transition economies.
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Table 2.4
Estimation results with FHI
Translog without

Cobb-Douglas

Translog with EA

Cobb-Douglas

regional dummy

without regional

dummy (3)

with EA dummy

(1)

dummy (2)

Constant

9.23** (2.68)

10.00*** (19.99)

10.25** (3.58)

10.58*** (21.69)

k

-0.46* (-1.86)

0.1*** (13.87)

-0.65** (-3.01)

0.09*** (12.18)

l

1.18** (4.51)

0.76*** (24.24)

1.35*** (8.4)

0.73*** (22.86)

k2

0.03*** (30.13)

-

0.03*** (34.28)

-

l2

-0.02 (-1.22)

-

-0.03** (-2.7)

-

kl

-0.01 (-0.82)

-

-0.001 (-0.9)

-

time

-0.02** (-4.0)

0.03** (2.92)

-0.02*** (-5.12)

0.03** (2.91)

Constant

-34.86*** (-0.6)

-44.14*** (-15.01)

-33.68*** (-26.59)

- 51.27*** (-0.67)

COMP1

1.23*** (9.61)

0.81** (4.89)

0.82** (3.86)

0.59** (2.43)

COMP2

2.46*** (7.4)

13.8** (3.2)

1.48** (3.45)

0.96** (2.33)

FHI

2.85*** (12.27)

5.3*** (12.19)

3.68*** (13.02)

6.7*** (17.74)

- 15.82*** (-2.77)

-7.8*** (-6.57)

(4)

Production frontier

Efficiency effects

East Asia
Time trend

1.1*** (11.81)

0.89*** (7.9)

0.79*** (5.46)

0.86*** (7.1)

σ2

13.64*** (24.1)

19.41*** (10)

11.57*** (11.64)

25.12*** (10.66)

γ

0.99*** (3423.1)

0.99*** (402.11)

0.99*** (3425.9)

0.99*** (715.15)

Log likelihood

-195.73

-419.4

-181.75

-414.3

Likelihood ratio test

845.86

425.4

873.82

435.6

t-ratio in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Higher COMP1,
COMP1 and FHI mean less freedom.

In efficiency analysis, it is important to have good specification of the
production function since different technologies will result in different measures of
efficiency. As mentioned in Section II the Cobb-Douglas technology has been rejected
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in several tests. Here, following the same line, specification tests are also done by
calculating generalized likelihood ratios and they show that translog models should be
used in frontier and efficiency analyses for transition economies (the ratios are 447.4
and 465.2 for specification with and without EA dummy respectively).
The first important finding of this chapter is the significance of economic and
political freedoms in determining efficiency. In all the models presented in the Table
2.4, economic and political freedoms have positive and significant coefficients. Since uit
in equation (2.8) is inefficiency (or distance from the frontier) and higher values of
economic and political freedoms means less freedom, the positive coefficients can be
interpreted as implying that higher level of freedom is associated with higher level of
efficiency.
Empirically, the effect of democracy on growth and efficiency has been
controversial in the literature. Minier (1998) finds that countries that democratized early
growth faster than others who did not choose a democratic path. Barro (1996) reports a
hump-shaped relationship between democracy and growth. When trying to disentangle
the effect of democracy on growth Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) concludes that, overall,
the negative effect of democracy is larger than the positive one. In Adkins et al. (2002)
the Political Rights and Civil Liberties are not significant. Here they do turn out to be
significant both through the composite index and on their own (Table A2.1 in the
Appendix), even after the economic freedom has been controlled for. This is consistent
with the result found in Meon and Weill (2005) for a larger set of countries that the rule
of law and control of corruption are associated with higher efficiency.
The second significant finding is that the coefficient of East Asia dummy is
negative and significant. This means that East Asia’s transition economies on average,
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ceteris paribus, are more efficient than the Eastern European and Former Soviet Union
countries in the sample. This empirical result may look counter-intuitive for some
people since many Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
for example) have rather advanced production base vis-à-vis the East Asian ones.
However, this result can manifest the fact that the Eastern European transition
economies underwent an initial period of “disorganization” when the old production
system was destroyed almost overnight and a new one has not been in place (Blanchard
and Kremer, 1997). It takes time to build new business links, to employ new technology
and to adjust production methods to market signals, especially when market was
fledgling. At the same time China, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia had been
experimenting with market economy for a while before the beginning of the period
under study. The interesting point is that East Asian transition countries manage to use
more efficiently the resources they have though they have less production capacity than
Central and Eastern European ones in this period.
Among the East Asian economies China was the first to reform and adopt
market economy, though gradually. More importantly, China is a huge country and it
has produced a remarkable growth rate since the beginning of its reform. Therefore
there are reasons to believe that the East Asian effect is dominated by China and
possibly only by China. To check if Cambodia and Vietnam also have the efficiency
effect the model (3) in Table 2.4 is estimated again with a dummy for China and another
one for Cambodia and Vietnam in the efficiency equation. The result is that are both
significant (Table A2.2 in the Appendix). Thus, there seems to be evidence to suppor
the argument that the East Asian transition economies have higher efficiency than the
other countries in the sample given the same level of production factors and institutions.
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All this said, it is worth mentioning that East Asian countries have less economic and
political freedom on average (3.68 compared to 3.06 of CEE and 3.5 of FSU on
aggregate EFI score; 6.39 compared with 2.15 and 4.38 on FHI).
4.2.

Robustness check: endogeneity of capital and use of factor analysis

The capital series that is generated from equation (2.10) may be correlated with
output because it calculated with average output growth rate. This correlation would
make the estimation of production frontier and efficiency scores inaccurate. Therefore,
we re-estimate the model with lagged k. In addition, instead of using regional dummies
and time variable we use country dummies and year dummies to see if institutional
measures have any effect on efficiency scores after country-specific and year-specific
characteristics have been controlled for.
In the previous section we use principal component analysis to reduce the data
dimension of the economic freedom indexes but principal component analysis is less
accurate than principal factor analysis in exploring latent structures. In addition,
imposing orthogonality between components is not a practical strategy since
socioeconomic variables are usually correlated. Therefore, we apply principal factor
analysis to economic freedom indexes in order to in an effort to better conceptualize the
relationship between constructed indexes of economic freedom and transition progress
and investment rate. The difference between principal component analysis and factor
analysis is that principal component method uses all variability in an item while factors
analysis uses only the variability in an item that it has in common with the other items
for identifying latent structures. Therefore, factor analysis is seen as a better tool to
detect the underlying structure of the data and more accurate (Widaman, 1993).
Following factor analysis researchers often apply rotation techniques to find factors
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whose relationships with the underlying variables are clearer or easier to identify. In
other words, we make use of oblique rotation to have a clearer pattern of loadings. As
for the number of factors to be retained both scree test and parallel analysis suggest two
factors.
Table 2.5 shows the loadings of economic freedom indexes on the first two
components or factors, with and without rotation. Without rotation, factors and
components have high loadings from several indexes, which makes it difficult to
interpret the factors or components. When oblique rotation is applied we have a clearer
pattern of loadings. We can say that rotated factor 1 is defined by foreign investment
freedom and wage and price freedom while rotated factor 2 is defined by property
rights.
Table 2.5
Loadings of principal components and principal factors (rotated)
Principal component analysis

Factor analysis, no
rotation

Factor analysis,
rotation by oblique
method
Factor 1
Factor 2

Component 1

Component 2

Factor 1

Factor 2

Trade policy

0.317

-0.030

0.659

-0.002

0.166

0.263

Fiscal burden

0.145

0.453

0.280

0.287

0.028

0.002

Government
consumption

0.255

0.372

0.513

0.336

0.190

-0.045

Monetary
policy

0.160

0.641

0.323

0.577

-0.020

-0.024

Foreign
investment

0.375

-0.175

0.827

-0.151

0.798

0.085

Banking and
finance

0.382

0.063

0.836

0.125

0.359

0.337

Wage and
policy

0.366

0.079

0.798

0.150

0.761

-0.008

Property
rights

0.360

-0.341

0.803

-0.381

-0.050

0.918

Regulation

0.357

-0.294

0.790

-0.303

0.137

0.769

Informal
market

0.331

-0.040

0.696

0.012

0.088

0.456
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Table 2.6
Estimations with lagged k, East Asia dummy and time trend
Two
components
and FHI
(1)

Two
components
(2)

Two factors
and FHI
(3)

Rotated
Factor 1
(4)

Rotated
factor 2
(5)

FHI
(6)

Constant
k
l
k2
l2
kl
Time trend

8.46***
-0.48***
1.34***
0.03***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.03***

8.05***
-0.47***
1.36***
0.03***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.03***

8.75***
-0.48***
1.31***
0.03***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.03***

7.16***
-0.48***
1.5***
0.03***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.03***

7.79***
-0.47***
1.39***
0.04***
-0.02***
-0.03***
-0.03***

8.37***
-0.49***
1.37***
0.03***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.03***

Efficiency effects
Constant
COMP 1/Factor 1
COMP 2/Factor 2
FHI
East Asia
Time trend
Sigma-squared
Gamma
Log likelihood
Likelihood ratio test

-41.44***
0.3***
0.55
5.44***
-19.53***
0.48***
16.31***
0.99***
-238.62
902.97

-29.93***
3.32***
2.51***

-40.88***
-0.25
4***
4.51***
-17.66***
0.84***
17.05***
0.99***
-236.05
908.12

-22.31***
7.9***

-35.88***

-35.06***

Production frontier

-8.39***
1.52***
21.74***
0.99***
-276.98
826.26

12.15***
-15.75***
0.22**
21.45***
0.99***
-285.67
808.87

0.32
2.45***
20.14***
0.99***
-264.64
850.94

5.16***
-13.84***
0.27**
11.06***
0.99***
-252.63
874.95

*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Higher value of COMP1, COMP2, Factor
1, Factor 2 and FHI mean less freedom.

Table 2.6 presents the estimation results when lagged k is used in production
function, East Asia dummy, time trend and either principal components or principal
factors. Here, we focus only estimate translog production function since we have
evidence that translog function is favoured over Cobb-Douglas function. Likelihood
ratio tests for all specifications suggest that stochastic model is correct and that
efficiency is indeed significant. The general impression is that the effect of institutional
variables on efficiency is still significant. However, there are differences now as lagged
k is used. Result in column (1) of Table 2.6 shows that the second principal component
becomes insignificant though having expected sign. The specification in column (2)
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caters for the fact that there is considerable correlation between the two components and
FHI. Without FHI in the efficiency equation both components are significant and of
large magnitude. Concerning the principal factors, the first factor has unexpected sign
and is not significant when they are used together with FHI. However, when they are
used one by one all of their coefficients are significant and have expected sign. As for
East Asia dummy it is significant in all specification except in column (5) when the
second factor which indicates quality of property rights is used. That means property
rights institution is an important determinant of efficiency and when we only control for
property rights East Asia no longer has advantage in efficiency over other regions.
Table 2.7 presents the results when country and year dummies are used to
control for country-specific and year-specific variables that could have impact on
production efficiency of transition economies. In general the results are similar to those
obtained by using contemporaneous k with East Asia dummy and time trend (Table 2.4)
or lagged k with East Asia dummy and time trend (Table 2.6). In column (3) the
coefficient of the first factor is negative, which suggests that better institution in terms
of foreign investment and wage and price policy would lead to lower efficiency.
However, this result is flawed by correlation between the two factors (due to oblique
rotation) and FHI. Therefore, conclusions should be drawn from results in column (2)
and columns (4)-(6). Again, factor two or property rights institution is more important
than factor 1. Another thing to be noted is that when country and year dummies are used
the coefficients of institutional indicators are smaller as compared to when East Asia
dummy and time trend is used. Looking from any angle, however, we can confirm that
institutional quality has a significant and positive effect on efficiency of transition
economies.
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Table 2.7
Estimations with lagged k, country dummies and year dummies

Production frontier
Constant
k
l
k2
l2
kl
Time trend

Two
components
and FHI
(1)

Two
components
(2)

Two rotated
factors and
FHI
(3)

Rotated
Factor 1
(4)

Rotated
factor 2
(5)

FHI
(6)

9.58***
-0.5***
1.22***
0.04***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.02***

9.44***
-0.49***
1.21***
0.04***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.02***

9.71***
-0.51***
1.2***
0.04***
-0.02***
-0.02***
-0.02***

9.66***
-0.5***
1.2***
0.04***
-0.01***
-0.02***
-0.02**

9.56***
-0.49***
1.2***
0.04***
-0.01***
-0.02***
-0.02***

9.66***
-0.46***
1.13***
0.04***
-0.01***
-0.03***
-0.02***

Efficiency effects
Constant
-13.47***
-9.34*** -11.36*** -18.71***
-14.12*** -9.72***
COMP 1/Factor 1
0.72***
-1.84***
1.02***
0.53***
COMP 2/Factor 2
2.15***
5.18***
3***
2.33***
FHI
0.84***
0.68***
0.89***
Sigma-squared
8.83***
7.95***
8.49***
9.36***
8.33***
9.65***
Gamma
0.99***
0.99***
0.99***
0.99***
0.99***
0.99***
Log likelihood
-139.86
-138.19
-136.16
-144.04
-136.60
-149.26
Likelihood ratio test 1100.50
1103.84
1107.89
1092.13
1107.01
1081.71
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Higher value of COMP1, COMP2, Factor
1, Factor 2 and FHI mean less freedom. Country dummies are jointly significant and the same is true for
year dummies but their coefficients are not reported.

5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
The role of institutions in economic growth and efficiency has been discussed
widely in the literature. Though empirical results change from one measure of
institution to another, or from one dataset to another there seems to be a general
conclusion that institutions do have positive effects on growth and efficiency. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Bloc the experience of transition economies has provided
something akin to a natural experiment to test the effect of institutions on efficiency.
Applying stochastic frontier analysis technique, this chapter has confirmed the positive
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effects of economic and political institutions as measured by the Index of Economic
Freedom (Heritage Foundation) and the Freedom House Index respectively. For 28
transition economies over the period 1995-2005, more economic or political freedom is
found to reduce the level of inefficiency. In other words, better institutions are
associated with higher level of efficiency. Particularly, the use of principal factors has
shown that property rights protection is very important for improving production
efficiency. So far the empirical result about the effect of political freedom on economic
performance has been mixed but this empirical study shows that it does have significant
role in improving efficiency, at least in the context of transition economies. Of course
institutions do not solely determine efficiency but improvement of institutional quality
should help transition economies to gain higher efficiency. The positive role of
institutions found here is robust to different constructed measures of capital series
(depreciation rates of 10% and 6%).
Though the issue of causality between institution and efficiency is controversial
and the results obtained here can be subject to questions about the quality of
institutional measurement, we think this research will contribute to clearer
understanding of the role of institutions in economic performance, both economic and
political.
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CHAPTER III - INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF
INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES

1. INTRODUCTION
Investment is the key to maintaining and expanding the capital stock and
production capacity of an economy. In the neoclassical growth framework higher capital
accumulation means higher output and higher growth in transition to the steady state of
an economy. In endogenous growth theory investment affects growth directly through
accumulation of input and indirectly through improved factor productivity. New
investment in physical and human capital introduces new technologies into the
production base of an economy, thus improving its efficiency and productivity and
altering its long run growth rate. The role of investment has been empirically confirmed
in many studies such as: Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), De Long
and Summers (1991), Fischer (1993), Khan and Kumar (1997), Bouton and Sumlinski
(2000) and others. In fact, investment is one of the few determinants of growth that
remain significant in a sensitivity analysis by Levine and Renelt (1992).
Since the fall of the Soviet Bloc the former socialist countries in Central and
Eastern Europe and Central and Eastern Asia have embarked on largely different growth
paths. All of them except East Asian ones saw their output plunge in the early 1990s.
Following initial production collapse in Eastern and Central Europe and former Soviet
Union some countries quickly settled down and regained positive growth as early as
1992 or 1993 (Poland and Czech Republic) while others dragged on with their output
contraction until 1995-1996 (Russia, Ukraine, and some other former Soviet Union
countries). One the basis of growth performance, there seems to be some geographical
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pattern. Countries of the former Soviet Union had to endure longest output drop. Those
in Central Europe and Baltic area had a shorter period of recession. Those in East Asia
did not suffer from any output loss at all.
Many researchers have formulated theoretical explanations and empirical tests
for various factors that may have caused the marked variation in the growth
performance of transition economies. Among the often cited determinants of the growth
variation are initial conditions, liberalization and transition policies, and institutional
factors 15. The question about what drives investment has been long studied 16. However,
works in this field study broad cross sections or panels of countries that do not cover
transition economies. To our best knowledge, the literature on investment in transition
countries is focused on firms’ investment constraints and behaviour. Budina et al.
(2000) study the relation between liquidity constraints and firms’ investment in Bulgaria
and find that liquidity constraints only bind for small firms; large firms still have access
to easy bank finance. Similarly, Konings et al. (2003) find soft budget constraints for
firms in Bulgaria and Romania but Polish and Czech’s firms face hardened liquidity
constraints which are an impediment for investment. Mueller and Peev (2007) study
investment returns of publicly traded firms in Central and Eastern Europe and find
evidence of under investment due to asymmetric information and over investment due
to managerial discretion. In general, these studies use firm level data and relate firms’
investment behaviour to financial constraints. None has tried to explain difference in
investment rates for the whole group of transition countries. The purpose of this chapter
is to fill this gap in literature on transition economies. Since institutions are theoretically

15

See, for example, De Mello et al. (1996 & 2001), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Fidrmuc (2003),
Harvrylyshyn and Roden (2003), Falcetti et al. (2006) for details.
16
Some examples are: Levine and Renelt (1992), Ozler and Rodik (1992), Dawson (1998), Ghura and
Goodwin (2000), Attanasio et al. (2000) and Campos and Nugent (2003).
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proposed and empirically found to be a very important determinant of growth and
development, we are particularly interested in examining the role of institutions and
reform policies in explaining investment difference among transition economies.
Analyzing a dataset on transition economies over the period 1990-2007 we find
that institutional factors, both economic and political, have significant effect on the
investment rate. In addition, more transition progress is also found to be associated with
higher investment. Besides, domestic saving and financial deepening are strong
determinants of investment as well.
Section 2 of this chapter will explore possible determinants of investment in
transition economies. Section 3 will discuss institutional development and investment in
transition economies since the early years of the transition process. After that Section 4
will present the data and empirical approach for estimating the effects of institutional
factors on investment. Section 5 will discuss the results and the chapter is concluded in
Section 6.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW - DETERMINANTS OF INVESTMENT RATE
In this section we explore some essential factors that are theoretically expected
and empirically proven to affect investment rate in contexts other than transition
economies. They are categorized as institutions, transitional reform policies,
macroeconomic factors, and financial development.
2.1.

Institutional factors

As discussed in Chapter 1, institutions facilitate economic exchanges and
determine resource allocation and efficiency of economic activities. An important
indicator of the quality of institution is the level of freedom, both economic and
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political, that economic actors can enjoy in pursuit of their economic goals. When
people are free from fear of expropriation and troubles inherent in market (information,
agency, coordination, etc.) they have more incentive to invest in economic activities and
do so with higher efficiency.
With regard to investment the most important institution is the protection of
property rights. Without secure property rights the incentives to invest will be reduced,
especially in research and development activities that require large investment but,
potentially, are very profitable. When properties are not properly protected resources
will be diverted away from production, often to rent-seeking activities which further
deter investment while encouraging further rent-seeking. Murphy et al. (1993) argue
that rent-seeking activities exhibit natural increasing returns, which may lead to
multiple equilibria with high levels of rent-seeking and low output. Acemoglu (1995)
shows that rent-seeking reduces marginal productivity of investment and that increased
rent-seeking makes rent-seeking relatively more attractive compared to investment in
production. It has been argued by many authors, like North (1990) and Knack and
Keefer (1995), that the private property rights are the backbone of the prosperous
Western capitalism.
Transaction cost is a big hurdle for economic exchange and evolution of
institutions through economic history has been the finding of solutions to the problem of
high transaction cost. New institutions help reduce transaction cost, encourage more
production and exchanges, thus allowing economic actors to realize gains from
specialization and trade. As a result productive activities become more attractive and
more investment is made. With the same level of investment, lower transaction cost
means more output.
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Corruption is an example of bad institutions and it is very harmful to investment.
Corruption is a kind of tax, hence raising costs and uncertainty for business activities.
Worse than tax, corruption is not transparent, not predictable and not reliable.
Corruption tends to reduce government revenues (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998) because
corruption is the most manifest in tax collection and the corrupt money, instead of being
spent by the government on investment or consumption, goes into private pockets.
Therefore the level of investment will be lower when corruption is rampant, which is
proved empirically by Mauro (1995). More seriously, corruption makes investment less
efficient. In public sector corruption may shift public investment away from the most
profitable projects to less profitable ones that offer more opportunities for corruption
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Pritchett (2000) cites an example of a steel mill in Nigeria
where spending overshot by US$ 4 billion and US$ 2 billion are reported to be stolen by
government officials. In the private sector, corruption favours those with connections
with government officials over those who have high productive efficiency (Elliott,
1997). In addition, bad governance reduces the incentive to invest in R&D (Meon and
Weil, 2005), thus limiting opportunities to improve efficiency.
However, there have been arguments that corruption helps “grease the wheel”
(Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; and Leys, 1965 as cited in Meon and Sekkat, 2005). The
hypothesis suggests that corruption and bribery may be the second best solution due to
distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions. When bad institutions are in place and
there are no ways to change them, corruption may serve as a device to overcome hurdles
to economic transactions, investment and promoting growth. This hypothesis has been
tested by Meon and Sekkat (2005) and they find evidence against it. Their study shows
that a weak rule of law, an inefficient government and political violence make the
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negative effect of corruption on investment worse. So, it seems that all empirical
evidences point to the negative effect of corruption on investment.
Apart from institutions that constrain directly economic activities, political and
civil institutions are also very important for capital accumulation. Rodrik (2000)
considers democracy as a meta-institution for building good institutions and argues that
participatory political systems are the most effective ones for processing and
aggregating local knowledge which is essential for building institutions. Sandholtz and
Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when democratic norms and institutions are
stronger. In an effort to explain causes of corruption Treisman (2000) also concludes
that democracy reduces corruption though it is well-established democracy rather than
recent democratization process that matters (Sung (2004) also comes to similar
conclusion). As Dawson (1998) empirically shows, political and civil liberties stimulate
investment in a cross section of 85 countries.
2.2.

Transitional factors

Transition process involves liberalization of markets and prices, privatization of
state-owned firms, restructuring firms towards market incentives and building economic
and social institutions and infrastructures to promote growth. When markets and prices
are liberalised, investors have more incentives to invest and do business because they
have the freedom to set prices and sell and buy goods to where/who they want.
Privatization of state assets is perhaps the most important drive for investment because
more assets are in private sector’s hand with their rights recognized by the state.
Privatization is a signal of commitment to private ownership and offers profitable
investment opportunities, especially in public utilities sector (Holland and Pain, 1998).
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Besides, governments would have larger budget from privatization proceeds to spend on
public investment.
Structural reforms in transition countries have been implemented extensively,
especially privatization of small scale enterprises (IMF, 2000). However, the reform
progress has been uneven across countries. In 2005 the Transition Index, which is
constructed by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) to
reflect the transition progress, ranges from 1.89 (Turkmenistan) to the highest level of
4.3 (Hungary, Czech Republic and some others).
Reform as measured by the EBRD Transition Index is expected to boost
investment in transition countries because they create room for private sector’s
participation in economic activities through privatization and incentives for
entrepreneurs to invest. Moreover, privatization generates government revenue for
government investment development programmes.
2.3.

Macroeconomic and financial factors

Macroeconomic policies, together with institutions, shape the incentive
structures that investors face when making investment decision. Domestic saving and
growth provide the necessary resources for both government and entrepreneurs to
invest. Trade policy, macroeconomic stability (inflation) and public finance are
important factors to be considered. Financial system is the blood vessel of an economy
that channel funds from saving to investment and the level of financial development is
expected to have a strong role in determining investment of an economy.
The relationship between saving and investment has been a focal topic in
economic literature since the study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), which identified
what later came to be called the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Contrary to the prediction of
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the perfect capital mobility theory, Feldstein and Horioka observe that, for OECD
countries, domestic saving rates and domestic investment rates are highly correlated.
Nowadays, global financial integration has gone very far but most transition economies
still face many obstacles in accessing the international capital market and domestic
savings is still critical for investment and growth. Analyzing a panel of 150 countries
over 1960-1994 period, Attanasio et al. (2000) find that lagged saving rates are
positively correlated with investment rates. As a result, we expect that lagged savings
rate in transition economies should have a positive effect on the investment rate.
The significant role of investment in growth has been found in many cross
section studies as mentioned in the Introduction. Some other growth models suggest that
a rise in productivity growth causes both growth rates and investment rates to move
together (Barro, 1991 and Islam, 1995). For the effect of growth on investment the
accelerator theory argues that high growth rates lead to high demand for capital stock
and real investment and vice versa though the adjustment may take time. The effect
could also run indirectly through saving rate as Loayza et al. (2000) shows that private
saving rates rise with the level and growth rate of real income. Empirically, when the
dynamics of the growth-investment relation is studied it has been shown that “growth
rates Granger-cause investment rates with a positive sign” (Attanasio et al., 2000).
Therefore, we expect lagged growth rate to have positive effect on investment.
Gains from trade have long been studied and emphasized in the economic
literature. A more export-oriented economy would have more access to world market,
which makes it possible for producers to invest and obtain gains from economy of scale.
More export would bring about more foreign exchange earnings necessary to finance
import of capital goods, which is very important for economies in the process of
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restructuring their production base. However, trade liberalization may lead to domestic
market being swamped by imported goods and domestic producers find it hard to
compete, thus limiting domestic producers’ investment and expansion activities.
Therefore, there is an argument for protection of some infant industries with high level
of externalities, learning by doing and economy of scale against foreign competition
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). Of course whether the infant industries grow to be
competitive internationally requires much more than protection by trade measures.
According to Fisher (1993) inflation is the most important single indicator of the
macroeconomic environment as far as investment and growth is concerned. Inflation
signals uncertainty and makes it difficult for investors to evaluate their investment
projects, thus forcing them to postpone investment. During high inflation episodes
economic actors tend to switch from long term to short term transactions, which
increase transaction cost. In some empirical studies inflation has been found to have
significantly negative effect on private investment (e.g. Greene and Villanueva, 1991;
Ozler and Rodrik, 1992 and Madsen, 2003). However, high inflation often means low
real interest rate, which makes borrowings cheaper for investors. Romer (2001) argues
that inflation is also a potential source of government revenue through seignorage and
under some conditions it is optimal for government to use this revenue resource in
addition to usual taxes. Empirically, Bleaney (1996) finds no negative effect of inflation
on total investment. Therefore, we can expect some mixed or insignificant effect of
inflation on investment.
Analyzing an endogenous growth model with government spending, Barro
(1990) argues an increase in non-productive government expenditures, for a given level
of productive government expenditures, would raise income tax rate. As a result, private
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sector investment would decrease because individuals have less incentive to invest. In
reality, it is possible that an increase in non-productive government spending leads to a
decrease in investment in both public and private sectors. Especially, if government
consumption is financed by borrowing it gives rise to public debt and consequently
investors’ doubt about the stability of the macroeconomic environment and future tax
burden. Empirically, Barro (1991) shows that higher government consumption is
associated with lower growth in a panel of 98 countries in the 1960-1985 period.
Therefore, higher level of government consumption relative to GDP is expected to have
negative impact on investment.
Availability of finance is one of the most important factors for entrepreneurs to
carry out business activity. Financial system pools savings together and channels funds
from savers to investors. Without a financial system savers often hoard their savings in
non-productive assets such as gold and jewellery. According to Levine (1997)
individual savers may not have the time, capability and means to collect and process
information on firms and investment opportunities, therefore they are not willing to
invest. Financial institutions help solve this information problem. Financial institutions
select, supposedly, the best investors who can make the most from available funds.
Financial system in developing or transition economies play an even more important
role because firms in these economies depend more on external financing than those in
developed economies (Oshikoya, 1994). In addition, financial intermediation creates
money and provides means of transaction, reducing transaction cost and promoting
economic exchange and expansion of production (Levine, 1997). Without a wellfunctioning financial system it is very difficult for firms to engage in selling their

53

Chapter III

Institutional Determinants of Investment
in Transition Economies

products to foreign markets and importing capital goods for investment and expansion.
In general, we can expect a positive effect of financial deepening on investment.
Last but not least, interest rate is the cost of capital that is taken into account
when investment decisions are made. High interest rates mean high discount rates which
render projects not viable financially, especially for small or newly-established
businesses that are more reliant on borrowings. Bernanke (1983) reports that high
interest rates are a major source of sluggishness in capital expenditure in 1947-1979
period in the United States. For developing countries, Greene and Villanueva (1991)
shows that real interest rate is one of several macroeconomic determinants of private
investment in the 1975-1987 period. Therefore, we also include real interest rate as an
explanatory variable. One thing we should keep in mind is that our dependent variable
is total investment rate which includes both private and public investment as percentage
of GDP. In episodes of high interest rates private investment may be depressed but
public investment may not be affected since major investment projects are planned and
implemented over a long period of time. In times of tightened monetary policy the
government may utilize fiscal expansion to maintain the demand level through
investment in infrastructure projects. Therefore, in the context of this study it is an open
question whether real interest rate would have a significant effect on the national
investment rates. One more thing to keep in mind is that real interest rate might be
correlated with inflation rate and regressions that include both of them might be biased
due to multicollinearity.
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3. INSTITUTIONS AND INVESTMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
3.1.

Institution building in transition economies

Transition economies are in a process of building new market-based institutions
to promote economic growth. Most of them started with an “institutional collapse”
(Campos and Coricelli, 2002) which is often cited as one of the reasons for the initial
output drop in these economies. However, institutional quality in transition economies
has improved quickly and substantially. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the evolution
of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 17 (IEF) and the Freedom
House Index (FHI) 18. The Heritage Foundation’s Index is a composite index of ten
different factors of economic freedom rated on the scale of 0-100, with higher value
representing more freedom. The FHI is a measure of political freedom which is a simple
average of civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) with score going from 0 to 7
with 7 being no freedom. In Figure 1, for the ease of comparison, the Freedom House
Index is rescaled to the 0-100 range and higher value means more freedom 19. The lines
in Figure 1 represent the averages of either IEF or FHI for three groups of transition
economies: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), former Soviet Union (FSU) and East
Asia (EA). All three groups have made significant moves towards freedom, both
economic and political, but the CEE countries are the fastest. They started with better
institutional quality and are now in a much better position than the FSU or EA
countries. The EA countries started at the lowest level of freedom and are still far
behind the others.

17

See Holmes et al., 2008 for details.
Data available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439
19
See more details about these indexes in Section 4
18
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Another widely used measure of economic freedom is the Fraser Institute’s
Economic Freedom Index (EFI) 20. This index is available from 1970 but before 2000 it
is only available for every five years. Besides, we have EFI for only 21 transition
countries. The EFI scores ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being most free. Figure 2 in the
Appendix shows the changes of EFI for three groups of transition economies over 20002006 and we can see the same trend as shown in Figure 1.
There is a wide gap in institutional quality between transition economies. Some
countries have achieved institutional quality that is at the same level or even higher than
developed countries. In 2008 Latvia, Czech Republic and Hungary had higher IEF score
than France or Portugal. At the same time Russia, Belarus and Turkmenistan were
ranked 136, 147 and 152 respectively out of 157 countries in 2008. In terms of political
freedom, the Freedom in the World Report 2008 categorizes all CEE countries as free
while most of FSU and EA countries as not free. The experience of transition
economies in terms of building a completely new institutional system (in Central and
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries) or reforming an old system (in East
Asia) for the functioning of a market economy can be viewed as something close to a
natural experiment for analyzing the effect of institutions on investment.
3.2.

Investment in transition economies

Initially, investment fell sharply in the CEE and FSU countries. When the
government revenue was low and business environment was just taking form this was
quite a foreseeable situation. In East Asian countries, though the investment did not fall
but it hardly saw any growth in the early 1990s. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows that the
investment was cut the most in the FSU countries and these are the last who recovered

20

See Gwartney et al., 2008 for details
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from investment downturn. On average, EA has the highest investment growth
(11.13%), followed by CEE (6.62%) and FSU (3.65%).
Figure 4 in the Appendix depicts the investment-GDP rates of transition
economies by groups. Except for 1990 the EA has always maintained a higher
investment rate than those of CEE and FSU. Since 1997 this rate has gone up from
around 25% to 33% (in 2007). The investment rates of CEE and FSU have also
increased from 20% in early 1990s to 25% in 2007.
Figure 5 (Appendix) is a scatter plot of the investment rate and GDP growth rate
in 30 transition economies over the 1995-2006 period. It shows us some positive
association between growth rate and investment rate. Though the investment-growth
relation is not the subject of this chapter it helps justify the purpose of this. If we know
factors that drive investment we may know what drives growth, at least partially. To
better understand causes of growth we need to understand the factors that determine the
investment rate.

4. DATA AND MODEL
4.1.

Data

For economic freedom the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom
(IEF) and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI) are the most popular
measures. However, the Fraser Institute’s EFI covers only 21 transition countries 21 and
before the year 2000 it was only available for every five years. Therefore, we use the
Heritage Foundation’s IEF as a proxy of economic freedom. The data start in 1995 and
are available for all transition countries. The IEF is a simple average of 10 individual

21

18 Central and Eastern European countries and three East Asian countries.
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freedoms which are considered vital to the development of personal and national
prosperity. The individual freedoms are: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom,
property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom. The methodology for
constructing the freedoms has been revised several times to enhance the robustness and
the entire time series have been recalculated accordingly. For the 2008 version of the
IEF the authors use a 0-100 percent grading scale so that a higher score represents more
freedom. The difference between this data set and others is that the values of the
variables are calculated with data available from various sources like the World Bank
Development Indicators 22, which are more objective than subjective survey data. For
available data, the correlation coefficient between the Heritage Foundation’s IEF and
the Fraser Institute’s EFI is 0.83 (126 observations).
For political institutions, two measures are widely used in the literature: civil
liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) reported in the Freedom House’s Freedom of the
World (Rodrik, 2000; and Havrylyshyn and Rooden, 2003, for example). The Freedom
House uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and freedoms
enjoyed by individuals in almost all countries in the world since 1972. Political rights
refer to free participation in the political process, right to vote freely for distinct
alternatives in legitimate elections, right to compete for public office, join political
parties and organizations. Civil liberties mean the freedoms of expression and belief,
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without
interference from the state. The Freedom of the World does not rate government or
government performance per se but the real world rights and freedoms. The PR and CL

22

See Miles et al. (2006) for details.
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are scored from one to seven for each country in each year with larger number
indicating less freedom. The PR and CL are highly correlated (0.94) in this sample.
The EBRD transition scores are the judgement of the EBRD’s Office of the
Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition. The scores range from 1
to 4+, with 4+ coded as 4.33 and 4- equal 3.67 and so on. Averages are obtained by
rounding down. For example, a score of 2.6 is treated as 2+, but a score of 2.8 is treated
as 3-. The higher the scores the more transition progress a country has made. The
following aspects of transition are assessed and scored: large scale privatization, small
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade
and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate
liberalization, securities market and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure
reform. Due to data availability, we do not use scores of infrastructure reform in this
chapter. The data on transition indicators is available for download from the EBRD’s
website. Unfortunately, we do not have the transition indicators for four East Asian
transition countries (Cambodia, China, Laos and Vietnam).
Data for dependent variable and control variables other than institutional ones
are collected from the World Bank Development Indicators (2008). Investment is total
fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP. Saving is domestic saving as percentage
of GDP. Growth is the real GDP growth rate. Openness is measured by the sum of
import and export as percentage of GDP. For inflation we use the change in GDP
deflator instead of change in Consumer Price Index (CPI) because the CPI inflation
series has more missing observations. Real interest rate is the difference between
average lending rate and inflation rate which is based on GDP deflator. For financial
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development we use a very popular indicator which is the liquid liabilities as percentage
of GDP (M3/GDP).
Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics
Variable

Observation

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Investment

373

23.69

6.72

4.03

53.20

Growth

383

5.44

5.10

-16.70

34.50

Saving

374

17.58

13.15

-22.65

57.61

Real interest rate

334

7.62

15.70

-70.15

77.11

OPEN

382

99.29

32.48

36.39

181.68

M3

366

36.77

27.94

6.72

163.31

Government consumption

375

15.60

5.41

3.47

29.39

Inflation

383

31.81

104.71

-5.18

1174.29

Economic Freedom

358

54.53

9.45

30.02

77.96

Transition Index

338

3.79

0.67

1.78

4.33

Freedom House Index

390

3.80

2.02

1

7

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; author’s
calculation.

Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of variables used in this chapter and
Table 3.2 shows the pair-wise correlation between them. As discussed in Section II,
there are quite large variations in both the dependent and independent variables. The
correlation between three composite measures of institution is high, ranging from 0.58
to 0.74 in absolute value (Table 3.2). This suggests some consistency in measuring
institutional quality in transition economies, especially between the economic freedom
and transition progress index (correlation coefficient of 0.74). In addition, inflation and
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real interest rate are significantly and negatively correlated (-0.37). This calls for
caution when both inflation and interest rate are used in the same regression equation.

Table 3.2
Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
Growth

Saving

Interest
rate

Openness

M3

Government
consumption

Inflation

Economic
Freedom

Transition
Index

Growth

1

Saving

0.0638

1

Interest rate

0.0797

-0.0564

1

Openness

0.0273

0.0153

-0.0478

1

M3

0.0201

0.3805

-0.0841

-0.0356

1

Government
consumption
Inflation

-0.211

0.0798

-0.031

0.1256

0.0996

1

-0.3695

-0.1369

-0.3713

0.066

-0.0635

-0.0685

1

Economic
Freedom
Transition Index

0.1072

-0.0121

0.068

0.3012

0.2325

0.1723

-0.2452

1

0.5501

-0.1715

0.2390

0.1612

0.1706

-0.0163

-0.2613

0.7448

1

Political Freedom

0.0437

0.077

-0.0321

-0.2753

-0.1181

-0.349

0.0916

-0.662

-0.58

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; author’s
calculation.

4.2.

Model and methodology

In order to test empirically for the role of institutions in determining investment
rate we estimate a panel data model as follows:
INVit = α0+α1INSit+ α2GROi,t-1+ α3SAVi,t-1+ α4OPENit+ α5M3it+ α6INF+ α7IRit +
α8GCONit+ ci +εit

(3.1)

with i=1, 2, …N and t=1, 2, …, T
The dependent variable INVit is investment as percentage of GDP and ci is an
unobserved effect that is country specific and time constant. The εit are the idiosyncratic
errors that change across time t and country i. INSit is institutional variable which can be
composite indexes like IEF, FHI and EBRD or any individual factors of them. GROi,t-1
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is the lagged real GDP growth rate 23. SAVi,t-1 is the lagged gross domestic saving as
percentage of GDP. OPENit is the level of openness of an economy or the ratio of the
sum of import and export to GDP. M3it is the ratio of liquid assets to GDP. INFit is
inflation rate based on GDP deflator and IR is real interest rate. GCONit is the
government consumption as percentage of GDP.
This is a panel data model with a country specific unobserved effect that can be
estimated by either fixed effect (FE) estimation or random effect (RE) estimation
techniques 24. The difference between FE and RE is that the RE model assumes no
correlation between the regressors and ci. If the assumption is correct, together with
assumptions on the idiosyncratic error, the RE is more efficient than the FE. Otherwise,
the RE is not consistent but the FE is. When estimating this model we try both FE and
RE and test for the one that fits the data better and report results accordingly 25. Besides
we also test for the exogeneity of the regressors 26. The test results reject the hypothesis
that OPENit, M3it, INFit, IRit, GCONit are endogenous. We always report results which
are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. In the literature, static panel
models have been used before to study determinants of investment (Mueller and Peev,
2007; Ghura and Goodwin, 2000; and Odedokun, 1997).
As we can see in the Table 3.2, the IEF, FHI and EBRD are highly correlated.
Therefore they are entered to the regression equation separately 27. For estimation with
23

Use of real GDP per capita growth rate does not change the result.
We also estimated a dynamic panel model by differenced GMM two step robust method but the lagged
dependent variable is not significant though Sargan test confirms validity of instruments and there is no
second order serial correlation.
25
Hausman test is often used to determine the choice of RE or FE but Hausman test is not robust to
heteroskedasticity of the error term. We use a robust method suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p.290)
which is done by “xtoverid” command in STATA.
26
Under strict exogeneity, γ should not be significant in the regression ∆yit = ∆xit β + wit γ + ∆ε it
24

where wit is a subset of xit (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 285).
27
When any pair of them is used in a regression at least one variable becomes insignificant.
Consequently, they are used separately.
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IEF and its individual indexes we use the data for the period 1995-2007 because the IEF
is only available from 1995. For estimation with FHI, EBRD and their components the
data is from 1990-2007 but the EBRD data is only available for 26 countries (former
socialist countries in Eastern Europe and members of the former Soviet Union plus
Mongolia). Because of missing observations our dataset is an unbalanced panel. A list
of countries in the dataset and country averages of variables used in our regression can
be found in the Table A3.1 of the Appendix.

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1.

Baseline results

First, we estimate equation (3.1) with the composite measures of economic
freedom (IEF), political freedom (FHI) and transition progress (EBRD). Table 3.3
shows the result of the estimations.
Table 3.3
Regressions with inflation and interest rate
Dependent variable: investment/GDP

Institution

IEF
(1)
0.11**

FHI
(2)
0.09

EBRD
(3)
4.379***

PR
(4)
0.099**

CL
(5)
0.012

Lagged growth

0.01

0.13

0.02

0.135*

0.131

Lagged saving

0.15***

0.12*

0.099

0.125*

0.098

Openness

0.02

0.02

-0.004

0.019

0.029

M3/GDP

0.09***

0.09***

0.106***

0.104***

0.105***

Inflation

0

0

0.002**

0

0

Interest rate

0

-0.02

-0.013

-0.019

-0.011

Government consumption

0.02

0.01

0.049

0.026

-0.024

Constant

9.49***

10.31***

3.474

9.006***

13.9***

Estimation method

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

Number of observations

302

357

313

357

357

0.28
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.27
R2
*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).
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As we can see, economic freedom and transition progress indicators are
significant and have expected signs. The effect of EBRD measure is higher than that of
the IEF, which is due to the fact that EBRD index is measured on a much smaller scale.
The political freedom measure FHI is not significant but the political rights component
(PR) is positive and significant, which suggests that more political rights is associated
with higher investment rates. However, CL is not significant though it has an expected
sign. Of the control variables, saving and financial development indicator (M3/GDP)
perform well with expected and significant coefficients.
As discussed earlier the results in Table 3.3 may be incorrect due to correlation
between inflation and real interest rate. Hence, we estimate the model with inflation
only and real interest rate only, and the results are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5
below.
Table 3.4
Regressions with inflation
Dependent variable: investment/GDP
IEF

FHI

EBRD

PR

CL

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Institution

0.16***

0.136***

2.769***

0.11***

0.045

Lagged growth

-0.014

0.162***

0.112**

0.169***

0.165***

Lagged saving

0.129**

0.126***

0.108***

0.131***

0.115***

OPEN

0.009

0.006

0.007

0.006

0.019

M3/GDP

0.102***

0.055***

0.064***

0.069***

0.061***

Inflation

-0.001

0

0.002*

0

0

Government consumption

0.105

-0.073

-0.075

-0.096

-0.119

Constant

6.449*

12.24***

11.277***

13.2***

21.26***

Est. method

FE

FE

RE

FE

RE

No. of obs.

325

408

361

408

408

R2

0.3

0.31

0.29

0.3

0.28

*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).
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Table 3.5
Regressions with interest rate
Dependent variable: investment/GDP
IEF

FHI

EBRD

PR

CL

Institution

0.153**

0.087

4.018***

0.087

0.013

Lagged growth

-0.012

0.13

0.014

0.13

0.127

Lagged saving

0.14**

0.117*

0.102*

0.117*

0.099

Openness

0.02

0.021

-0.004

0.021

0.028

M3/GDP

0.106***

0.094***

0.108***

0.094***

0.105***

Interest rate

0.003

-0.017

-0.023

-0.017

-0.014

Government
consumption
Constant

0.137

0.013

0.034

0.013

-0.026

4.633

10.348***

4.921

10.348***

14.012***

Estimation method

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

Number of observations

302

357

313

357

357

0.29

0.29

0.29

0.31

0.27

2

R

*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).

The first thing to note is that we have strong consistency across various
specifications. Both inflation rate and interest rate are not significant in any
specification but we have the most significant results when only inflation is used. This
is our preferred specification 28.
According to Table 3.4, on average a ten point increase in the composite
measure of economic freedom, all else equal, is associated with 1.6% increase in the
investment rate and an additional point in political freedom (a lower score of FHI by
one point) is associated with 1.36% increase in the investment rate. Of the political
freedom measures, only the political rights have significant effect on investment but the
inclusion of civil liberties in the political freedom measure reinforces the effect (see
column (2) and (4) in Table 3). This may be due to the fact that we have more variation

28

We also estimate the model without inflation but the results do not change with respect to coefficients
of institutional variables with some reduction in R2. Models with a quadratic term of inflation are also
estimated without any significant coefficients of inflation. Lagged inflation rate is also used in place of
current inflation rate but the result does not change. Ghura and Goodwin (2000) do not find significant
effect of inflation either.
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in PR than in CL29. If the general indicator of transition progress EBRD is one point
higher we can expect to have an increase of 2.77% in the investment rate. Our result
here concurs with what is found in Dawson (1998) and Ghura and Goodwin (2000) with
regard to the effect of institutions on growth.
Lagged GDP growth rate is highly significant in all estimations except for that
with IEF (column (1)). When political freedom or transition index are used the effect of
lagged growth on investment is from 0.13 to 0.17, which means a 1% increase in last
year’s growth is associated with an increase of from 0.13% to 0.17% in investment rate.
The lagged saving rate also has significant impact on investment as expected and the
magnitude of the impact does not change much across estimations. A 1% increase in
lagged saving rate causes the investment to increase by from 0.11% to 0.13%.
In these estimations, the trade openness and inflation rate have no significant
effects on investment rate of transition economies. The indicator of financial
development M3/GDP is always significant and positive, which means more financial
deepening is associated with higher investment rate. The government consumption
expenditure has negative coefficients in all estimations but the effect is not significant.
5.2.

Results with individual indexes

The use of composite indexes of economic freedom aggregated from various
components has been criticised by several authors (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) on the
ground of the arbitrariness of weighting schemes and differences in effects of different
freedom components 30. Therefore, one question we want to answer is which individual
economic freedoms and transition indicators have significant effect on investment and

29

PR and CL have means of 3.85 and 3.88 and standard deviations of 2.21 and 1.77 respectively.
Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002) find that only legal structure, private ownership and freedom to use
alternative currency have positive and robust relation with growth.
30
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which are not.
Table 3.6
Estimation results with nine individual economic freedoms
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP
Business Trade

Fiscal

Government Monetary Investment Finance

Property Corruption

0.07*

0.034

0.036

0.017

0.018*

0.018

0.028

-0.01

0.045*

Lagged growth 0.035

0.016

0.003

0.022

0.008

0.03

0.027

0.027

0.022

Lagged saving 0.135** 0.149** 0.154*** 0.146**

0.14**

0.143**

0.144** 0.148*** 0.149**

OPEN

0.022

0.013

0.018

0.014

0.016

M3/GDP

0.113*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.123***

0.112*** 0.125***

0.12***

0.122*** 0.118***

Inflation

-0.002

-0.002

-0.001

-0.001

-0.001

-0.002

-0.002

-0.002

-0.001

Government

0.069

0.108

0.086

0.092

0.127

0.102

0.108

0.099

0.088

Constant

9.52**

11.56*** 11.69*** 12.65***

12.83

12.23***

12.24*** 13.87*** 12.18

Est. method

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

No. of obs.

325

325

325

325

325

325

325

325

325

0.28

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.27

Institution

0.014

0.011

0.015

0.017

consumption

2

R

*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).

Table 3.6 shows results of estimations with nine individual economic
freedoms 31. To our surprise, of the nine economic freedoms, we find that only three
have significant effect on investment rate: business freedom, monetary freedom and
freedom from corruption. The result shows that when individual freedoms are
considered they do not have strong effect on investment because each of them does not
make a considerable difference to the investment environment. However, when they
stand together in the form of a composite indicator (IEF) they have a significant joint
effect on investment. This calls for improvement of the quality of economic institutions
in all aspects in order to promote investment (an expectedly growth). With regard to
other explanatory variables the same results emerge in Table 3.6. Financial depending is

31

We do not use labour freedom because data for labour freedom is only available from 2005.
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consistently significant and positive while trade openness, inflation and government
consumption are not significant.
Table 3.7 shows estimation results when individual transition indicators are
used. All of them, except price liberalization, have a significant and positive effect on
investment rate. The result of price liberalization is unexpected because it is one of the
most advocated topics in transition reform. Among the transition indicators large scale
privatization has the highest effect on investment rate. The reason may be that large
scale privatization is a strong signal of commitment to restructuring of an economy and
determination to develop a market economy, which stimulates investment from private
sector. In addition, large scale privatization is an important source of revenue for
governments to carry out their development programmes. Progress in reforming
securities market and non-financial institutions have the smallest effect on investment.
It may reflect the fact that financial market in transition economies are still in the
very initial stage of development and they are mostly dependent on the banking system
to cater for their investment needs (Mueller and Peev, 2007). Once again, financial
development in form of the ratio of liquid assets to GDP has positive and significant
effect on investment rate.
5.3.

Results with principal components and factors

In Tables 3.3-3.5 we use indexes of economic freedom and liberalization which
are aggregated by equal weighting. Because arbitrary weighting schemes may not
appropriately reflect the magnitude or even the direction of each individual element’s
marginal impact (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000) we use principal components analysis
(PCA) to construct composite measures of freedom that best reflect the original data.
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Table 3.7
Estimation results for eight EBRD individual transition indicators
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP
Large scale

Small scale

Governance and

Price

Trade and

privatization

privatization

enterprise

liberalization

restructuring

Competition

Bank reform

Securities market and

foreign exchange policy

and interest

non-financial

system

liberalization

institutions

Institution

2.812***

1.681**

1.773*

0.626

1.223*

2.328**

1.563***

1.374**

Lagged growth

0.092**

0.11*

0.141***

0.167***

0.136***

0.14***

0.13***

0.135***

Lagged saving

0.101**

0.116***

0.109***

0.107***

0.108***

0.096**

0.108***

0.104***

-0.01

0.009

0.015

0.02

0.018

0.008

0.012

0.014

M3/GDP

0.075**

0.075***

0.063***

0.065***

0.069***

0.057**

0.058***

0.057**

Inflation

0.001*

0.001

0.001

0

0.001

0

0.001

0

Government consumption

-0.068

-0.087

-0.114

-0.131

-0.095

-0.062

-0.096

-0.117

Constant

12.21

12.58***

14.96***

16.17***

13.64

13.87

15.23***

16.57***

Est. method

FE

RE

RE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

No. of obs.

361

361

361

361

361

361

361

361

0.31

0.27

0.25

0.23

0.26

0.26

0.26

0.25

OPEN

2

R

*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).
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The PCA helps reduce the dimensionality of the data while retains the maximum
variation of the underlying variables. More importantly, the PCA does not impose any
subjective judgement but combine variables together according to their relative
variance. Moreover, by construction the principal components are independent of each
other. Usually, the number of principal components to retain for estimation is
determined by the parallel analysis and the Velicer’s minimum average partial
correlation analysis. Another “rule of thumb” is the Kaiser’s eigenvalue>1 but it is not
very popular.
After applying the PCA for nine IEF variables and eight EBRD variables and
selecting the number of components according to those methods, we come up with two
principal components (PC1 and PC2) for both the economic freedom measures and the
liberalization indexes. The reason is because for the economic freedom data Velicer’s
method suggests one, while the parallel analysis and Kaiser’s eigenvalue suggest nine,
which is not meaningful. For the EBRD data the Velicer’s method suggests two while
the parallel analysis and the Kaiser’s eigenvalue indicate that two components should be
used.
Though principal component analysis has a nice property of allowing the data to
determine both the proper magnitude and sign for aggregating the elements into a single
index, this method is not without caveat which is the difficulty in interpreting the
coefficients of the components because they are not chosen on the basis of any
relationship to the explained variable. In order to make sense of the components we
need to look at the relation between them and the underlying variables whose
relationship with the explained variable are better known to us. Table 3.8 shows the
eigenvectors of the components we retain. The left panel is for the first two components
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of the IEF data and the right panel is for those of the EBRD data.

Table 3.8
Eigenvectors of principal components (PC1 and PC2)
IEF

EBRD

Variable

PC1

PC2

Variable

PC1

PC2

BIZF

0.2609

-0.0416

LSPRI

0.3891

0.1627

TRAF

0.1811

0.0711

SSPRI

0.4284

-0.186

FISF

-0.0176

0.2881

RESTRU

0.2927

0.2772

GOV

-0.4076

0.4608

PLIB

0.3277

-0.4889

MONF

0.274

0.8098

TRA_FOREX

0.4757

-0.4339

INVF

0.418

-0.0259

COMPET

0.2262

0.35

FINF

0.4949

0.1109

BANK_IR

0.3582

0.2697

PROPF

0.3813

-0.1659

SECU

0.2574

0.4895

CORF

0.3044

-0.0388

Concerning the IEF data, the first component is strongly and positively related to
investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption but
it is strongly and negatively related to freedom of government. If we have higher score
for this component it can be attributed to either advance in investment freedom,
financial freedom, property rights and freedom from corruption or less freedom from
government. If the coefficient of this component is positive and significant we can say
that more involvement of the government in the economy is associated with higher
investment rate, which is not surprising given that we use total investment measure. The
second IEF component is dominated by monetary freedom and freedom from
government. Concerning the EBRD data, the first component is positively and strongly
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correlated with all measures of liberalisation. It can be seen as representing the overall
liberalization progress. The second EBRD component is positively related to
liberalisation scores in securities market, banking and interest rate and level of
competition but negatively related to liberalisation scores in terms of price and trade and
foreign exchange. So it can be thought of as a contrast between financial sector
liberalisation and price liberalisation. We have seen that price liberalisation alone does
not have significant effect on investment while other liberalisation indexes do in Table
3.7.
Table 3.9
Estimation results with first two components (PC1 and PC2) of IEF and EBRD
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP
Variable

IEF

EBRD

PC1

0.037**

1.366***

PC2

0.014

0.34

Lagged growth

0.003

0.085*

Lagged saving

0.131**

0.102**

OPEN

0.012

-0.008

M3/GDP

0.106***

0.077***

Inflation

-0.002

0.002**

Government consumption

0.14

-0.036

Constant

9.394***

8.218*

Estimation method

FE

FE

No. of obs.

325

361

0.29

0.3

2

R

PC1 and PC2 are first two components retained from the principal component analysis of the
underlying IEF and EBRD variables. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively (based on robust standard errors).

Using these principal components for regression we obtain the results as
presented in the Table 3.9. As we can see the first components of both IEF and EBRD
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data are positive and significant while both of the second components are not. The
results for economic freedom is reassuring when the simple average index is significant
but just some of individual variables are (Table 3.3 and 3.4). The result for the EBRD
components confirms the importance of liberalisation, including price liberalisation. An
increase in any liberalisation measures will lead to considerably higher score for the
first EBRD principal component and this is associated with higher investment rate. With
regard to control variables we have similar results as compared to previous
specifications.
Another method to reduce data dimension is factor analysis. The difference
between principal component analysis and factor analysis is that principal component
method uses all variability in an item while factors analysis uses only the variability in
an item that it has in common with the other items for identifying a latent structure.
Often, factor analysis is seen as a better tool to detect the underlying structure of the
data and more accurate (Widaman, 1993). In an attempt to add robustness to this study
we perform factor analysis to nine economic freedom indexes and eight EBRD
transition indexes to extract factors for regression analysis. Different criteria also
suggest that two factors should be retained for both economic freedom and transition
progress. Usually, after factor analysis researchers use rotation methods to simplify and
clarify the data structure in order to have a clearer picture of the relationship between
the factors and the underlying variables. However, there are cases in which we can
interpret the factors in terms of underlying variables without rotation. Here, we try to
use both rotated and unrotated factors. Rotation techniques are either orthogonal or
oblique but oblique rotation is often preferred because there are no ex ante reasons to
believe that factors are not correlated.
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Table 3.10
Loadings on rotated and unrotated factors of IEF and EBRD
IEF indexes

EBRD indexes

F1

F2

F3

F4

F1

F2

F3

F4

BIZF

0.803

0.018

0.743

0.119

LSPRI

0.909

0.018

0.414

0.342

TRAF

0.473

0.221

0.101

FISF

-0.070

0.624

0.153

0.378

SSPRI

0.906

0.211

0.158

0.687

0.095

RESTRU

0.935

-0.161

0.770

0.084

GOV

-0.623

0.472

-0.143

-0.121

PLIB

0.794

0.357

-0.068

0.954

MONF

0.267

0.541

-0.030

0.138

TRA_FOREX

0.886

0.302

0.076

0.820

INVF

0.818

0.103

0.918

-0.067

COMPET

0.844

-0.275

0.886

0.054

FINF

0.806

0.250

0.647

0.077

BANK_IR

0.939

-0.100

0.700

0.150

PROPF

0.870

-0.169

0.686

0.142

SECU

0.835

-0.336

0.984

-0.088

CORF

0.780

-0.082

0.246

0.105

Note: F1 and F2 are the first two unrotated factors; F3 and F4 are the first two rotated factors using
oblique rotation.

Table 3.10 shows the relationships between the two rotated and unrotated factors
and the economic freedom and transition indexes. When no rotation is used the factors
have high loadings from many indexes, which makes it difficult to identify a common
concept covering those indexes. When rotation is applied we can see a clearer pattern of
relationship between the factors and indexes. For economic freedom, we can see that F3
is defined by investment freedom and business freedom while F4 is defined by trade
freedom. For transition progress, F3 is defined by scores for securities markets and
competition while F4 is characterized by price liberalization and liberalization in trade
and foreign exchange. The IEF’s F3 can be thought of as an indicator of the economic
institution that supports entrepreneurship. The EBRD’s F4 can be generalized as an
index of price liberalization. Using these factors for estimation we get the results
reported in Table 3.11.
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Because oblique-rotated factors are by definition correlated they are not used in
the same regression equation 32. In general the results are similar to those obtained by
using principal components. We have positive and significant effects of institutional
indicators on investment rate. If we use unrotated factors then both IEF’s F1 and F2 are
significant (column 1-3) while only EBRD’s F1 is significant. Property rights index
loads the most on the unrotated IEF factor 1 which has a positive and significant effect
on investment. This shows that property rights are really important if investment is to be
increased to achieve higher rate or growth.
We are more interested in models with rotated factors and all of them are
significant and positive as expected. Previous results show that business freedom and
investment freedom, in isolation, can hardly have significant effect on investment but
when they are combined in a single measure (IEF Factor 3) they do have significant
effect on investment (column 4). The IEF’s F4 is a puzzle since it largely defined by
trade freedom which is not significant alone. Here, in contrast to the results in Table 3.7,
we see that price liberalization can serve as an important driver of investment. However,
price liberalization must be accompanied by other transition measures as well. This
suggests that the results in Table 3.7 may be affected by missing variable problem.

32

In fact, correlation between IEF’s F3 and F4 is 0.95 and between EBRD’s F3 and F4 is 0.83, which
reflects the fact that underlying indexes are correlated.
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Table 3.11
Estimation with IEF and EBRD unrotated (F1 and F2) and rotated (F3 and F4) factors
Economic freedom
IEF F1
(2)
1.843**

IEF F2
(3)

EBRD transition progress

Factor 1

IEF F1 and F2
(1)
1.741**

IEF F3
(4)
1.569*

Factor 2

0.954*

Lagged growth

-0.004

0.028

-0.006

0.029

-0.001

0.111**

0.111**

0.165***

0.119***

0.122**

Lagged saving

0.129**

0.138**

0.14**

0.136**

0.14**

0.109***

0.108***

0.106***

0.106***

0.111***

1.007*

IEF F4
(5)

EBRD F1 and F2
(6)
2.376***

2.807***

0.149

EBRD F1
(7)
2.318***

EBRD F2
(8)

EBRD F3
(9)
1.958**

-0.32

EBRD F4
(10)
2.261**

Openness

0.011

0.02

0.007

0.02

0.014

0.007

0.007

0.022

0.009

0.01

M3/GDP

0.106***

0.117***

0.111***

0.121***

0.097***

0.065***

0.063***

0.06**

0.056**

0.073***

Inflation

-0.002

-0.003

-0.002

-0.003

-0.003

0.002*

0.001*

0

0.001

0.002*

Government consumption

0.113

0.101

0.111

0.097

0.109

-0.074

-0.075

-0.136

-0.084

-0.083

14.802***

13.325***

14.921***

13.316***

14.623***

18.448***

18.56***

18.834***

19.04***

17.869***

Estimation method

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

RE

RE

RE

RE

RE

Number of observations

325

325

325

325

325

361

361

361

361

361

0.29

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.29

0.29

0.28

0.23

0.27

0.28

Constant

2

R

*, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (based on robust standard errors).

76

Chapter III

Institutional Determinants of Investment
in Transition Economies

6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
Investment is the vehicle of growth and efficiency. Without investment growth
cannot be sustained. More importantly, investment is the channel of “creative
destruction” that both raises production capacity and improves efficiency. For transition
countries investment plays a very important role because they need to restructure their
economies to shift production from central planning to market economy. Therefore, it is
important to understand what drives investment in transition economies.
This chapter shows that institutional factors play a significant role in explaining
investment differences. In general, higher degree of both economic and political
freedoms is associated with higher ratio of investment to GDP. However, it should be
stressed that one individual aspect of economic institution alone would not make much
difference. It is the overall bettering of the economic institutions that matters in
inducing investment. However, seems that investment and business freedoms may be
emphasized as key aspects of economic institutions that can strongly drive investment.
As far as political freedom is concerned political rights are seems to be more
important than civil liberties in promoting investment. Since many studies have
confirmed that institutions have significant effect on growth, even after controlling for
investment, and given the fact that investment has been found to have significant effect
on growth, our results further strengthen the argument for institutions as significant
factors in explaining economic growth. This is in line with Dawson’s (1998) claim that
institutions affect growth directly through total factor productivity and indirectly
through investment.
In addition, this chapter shows that those who are ahead in the transition process
have higher investment rate, especially with regard to large scale privatization and price
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liberalization. This should be an encouragement for transition countries that are still
lagging behind in the race to building a mature market economy. Last but not least,
domestic saving and financial development is crucial if transition countries are to boost
investment and achieve healthy growth. In general, the findings in this chapter are in
line with previous findings in the literature on determinants of investment. Our findings
are robust to different measures of institutions and specifications. Of course, they are
may be questioned on the ground of data quality and the general implications should be
viewed in the context of transition economies.
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CHAPTER IV- EFFECTS OF BANK OWNERSHIP ON BANK
LENDING - THE CASE OF INDIA

1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional macroeconomic models such as the IS-LM assume that monetary
policy affects the real economy by changing interest rates which, in turn, affects the
investment demand of the firms. This line of argument has increasingly come under
scrutiny. To begin with, there is evidence to suggest that investment decisions of firms
are affected much more by factors such as cash flows rather than by the cost of
borrowing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Further, there is evidence to suggest that
banks are not passive intermediaries between the central bank and end users of money
such as the firms. For example, in an early discussion of this issue, Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) demonstrate that the composition of banks’ portfolios changes
systematically in response to monetary policy initiatives. They conclude that the impact
of monetary policy on the investment of firms is not entirely demand driven, and that at
least part of it can be explained by the supply side or the bank lending channel. Kashyap
and Stein (1995) demonstrate that if a central bank pursues tighter monetary policy,
there is a decline in the amount of bank loans to firms and simultaneously a rise in the
issuance of commercial paper, and conclude that contractionary monetary policy reduce
loan supply.
Research suggests that there might be significant heterogeneity in the reaction of
banks to monetary policy initiatives. Peek and Rosengren (1995) argue that an
important determinant of a bank’s reaction is its capital-to-asset ratio. If banks find it
difficult (or expensive) to raise capital, for example, they would be reluctant to lend
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even if there is ample demand for credit in the aftermath of easing of monetary policy.
This hypothesis finds significant support in the empirical literature. Kishan and Opiela
(2000) find that monetary policy affects most banks that are small and undercapitalised.
Gambacorta (2005) too finds that lending of undercapitalized Italian banks is adversely
affected by contractionary monetary policy, even though lending is not correlated with
bank size. Further, there is a directional asymmetry in the impact of monetary policy on
the lending behaviour of undercapitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). In the event
of contractionary monetary policy, there is a sharp tightening in loan disbursal by
undercapitalised banks, but in the event of an expansionary monetary policy there is no
corresponding expansion of credit disbursal.
The reaction of banks to monetary policy would also depend on the composition
of their assets. The traditional or money view of monetary policy transmission assumes
that all asset classes are perfect substitutes of each other. If, therefore, contractionary
monetary policy leads to a reduction in deposits, a bank is capable of substituting for
this loss of deposits dollar for dollar, using other assets like CDs, such that loan supply
would not be affected. Stein (1998) argues that, contrary to this view, assets included in
a bank’s balance sheet are not perfect substitutes. For example, since deposits are
guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (or its overseas counterpart),
while CDs are not, there may be adverse selection in the market for CDs, such that
banks will not use these instruments to compensate for loss of deposits dollar for dollar.
This would result in a decline in loan supply. It follows that banks that have less liquid
assets such that it cannot quickly and costlessly compensate for loss of deposits in the
event of contractionary monetary policy or, alternatively, those that cannot raise funds
quickly to the same end, would react more to monetary policy changes. Kashyap and
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Stein (2000) find that monetary policy has greater impact on loan supply of small banks
and banks with low securities-to-assets ratios.
The literature does not, however, examine the impact of bank ownership on the
lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This is hardly surprising, given that
much of the literature is based on the United States and Western European experiences,
where private ownership of banks overwhelmingly dominates. However, as pointed out
by La Porta et al. (2002), state-ownership of banks is ubiquitous in much of the world,
especially in emerging markets. Indeed, the 2008-09 financial crisis has led to
emergence of significant state ownership of banking assets in countries such as the
United Kingdom, and concerns about the lending activities of the de facto nationalised
banks have brought into focus the impact of bank ownership on the lending channel in
the developed country context as well. This chapter tries to address this gap in the
literature and examine whether the impact of monetary policy on lending differs across
banks depending on their ownership.
India is a fast growing emerging market that embraced the market economy in
the early nineties and has since liberalised its economy substantially. Importantly, in the
absence of a well developed market for corporate bonds, 33 banks are by far the largest
source of credit for Indian companies, 34 and hence bank lending plays an important role
in the transmission of monetary policy in India. The Indian banking sector is also
marked by the presence of a number of state-owned and private-owned (including
foreign) banks, who compete on a level playing field. The state-owned banks
themselves have autonomy regarding lending decisions, and many of them have sold
shares to private (and even foreign) shareholders, thereby opening themselves up to
33

Corporate bonds account for only 3 percent of the Indian bond market (Asuncion-Mund, 2007).
Domestic credit provided by banking sector increased from 44.1% in 1995 to 64.2% of GDP in 2007
(World Bank Development Indicators, 2008).
34
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greater scrutiny. The state-owned banks are somewhat less efficient than their privately
owned counterparts (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003). However, evidence suggests that,
contrary to the popular wisdom about state-owned companies, ownership does not
significantly affect profitability of Indian banks (Sarkar et al., 1998; Bhaumik and
Dimova, 2004). The state maintains an arm’s-length relationship with the banks, such
that the banks are autonomous and focussed on profitability. In that respect, the stateowned and privately-owned banks are similar, and hence the presumption of profit
focus that underlies the analyses of banks in the stylised literature is applicable to all
Indian banks. There are, nevertheless, important differences between state-owned and
privately-owned banks in terms of their customer base (Berger et al., 2008), and also in
terms of factors that affect their lending (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2007). Therefore, there
are likely to be differences in ways in which the state-owned and privately-owned banks
react to monetary policies affected by India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI).
The results of this chapter indicate that banks of different types respond very
differently to monetary policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public
and foreign banks cut back on lending following monetary tightening but others do not
seem to react. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of
monetary tightening.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the banking system and the operation of monetary policy in India. Section 3 explains
the empirical methodology and the model specification, and discusses the data. The
results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2. BANKING SECTOR AND MONETARY POLICY IN INDIA
2.1.

Banking Sector

Independent India inherited a weak financial system. Commercial banks
mobilized household savings through demand and term deposits, and disbursed the
credit primarily to large corporations (Ghosh, 1988). This lop-sided pattern of credit
disbursal, and perhaps a spate of bank failures that reduced the number of banks from
566 in 1951 to 90 in 1968, led the government to nationalize the banks in 1969. The
main thrust of nationalization was social banking, with the stated objective of increasing
the geographical coverage of the banking system, and extension of credit to the priority
sector that comprised largely of agriculture, agro-processing, and small-scale industries.
This phase of banking in India was characterized by administered interest rates,
mandatory syndicated lending, and pre-emption of the banks’ deposit base by the
government in the form of measures like the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). Banks were
required to invest a significant proportion of their deposits in bonds issued by the
government and “approved” (quasi-government) institutions. At the same time, between
1969 and 1990, the nationalized banks added over 55,000 branches to their network
(Sarkar and Agarwal, 1997).
While the social agenda of the banking sector, measured in terms of
geographical and sectoral coverage, was arguably a success, the Indian banking sector,
about 88 percent of whose assets were managed by state-owned banks, was in distress.
While the ratio of gross operating profit of the scheduled commercial banks rose from
0.8 percent (of assets) in the seventies to 1.5 percent in the early nineties, the net profit
of the banks declined. More importantly, perhaps, financial repression involving stateowned banks was not in harmony with the agenda of real sector reforms that the
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government of India unleashed in the aftermath of the balance of payments crisis of
1991. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), therefore, initiated reform of the banking sector
in 1992, based on the recommendations of Narasimham Committee I (see Reddy, 1999).
Between 1992 and 1997, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) was reduces from 15
percent to about 10 percent, and the statutory lending requirement (SLR) was reduced
from 38.5 percent to 25 percent over the same period. The interest rates were gradually
liberalized. Prior to 1992, the lending rates structure consisted of six categories based on
the size of advances. During the 1992-94 period, the lending rates structure was
rationalised to three categories, and in 1994 banks were given the freedom to determine
interest rates on all loans exceeding Indian rupees (INR) 200,000 (i.e., USD 4,500). By
1998, banks were free to determine the interest rates for all loans, with the
understanding that the lending rates on loans up to INR 200,000 would not exceed the
declared prime lending rates (PLR) of the banks.
Prior to the initiation of reforms, banks were required to refer all loans above a
size threshold to the RBI for authorization, and formation of a consortium was
mandatory for all loans exceeding INR 50 million (about USD 1 million at currently
exchange rate). Bank credit was delivered primarily in the form of cash credit for use as
working capital, and there were significant restrictions on the ability of banks to deliver
term credit for projects. Finally, the RBI implemented selective credit controls on
“sensitive” commodities.
In the wake of the reforms, as early as in 1993, the threshold for the mandatory
formation of consortiums was raised from INR 50 million to INR 500 million. Further,
banks within consortiums were permitted to frame the rules or contractual agreements
governing the consortium lending. In 1996, selective credit controls on all sensitive
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commodities except sugar were removed. Banks were also allowed much greater
flexibility about the proportion of the cash credit component of the loans, the new floor
being 25 percent. The following year witnessed further elimination of credit controls:
Banks were no longer subjected to the instructions pertaining to Maximum Permissible
Bank Finance (MPBF), and were allowed to evolve their own methods for assessing the
credit needs of the potential borrowers. Further, banks were no longer required to form
consortiums to lend in excess of INR 500 million (about USD 10 million at current
exchange rate), and restrictions on their ability to provide term loan for projects were
withdrawn. However, prudential regulations required that an individual bank not be
over-exposed to any one (or group of) creditor(s).
Finally, in 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in
keeping with the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important
recommendation of the Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies
(ARCs) to simultaneously improve the quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to
facilitate recovery of loans. In a separate development, after a prolonged period of legal
disputes, debt recovery tribunals (DRTs) began functioning in India, in earnest, by
1999.
Another important aspect of the Indian banking reforms in 1990s is the opening
up of the banking market to private and foreign entries and privatization of state-owned
banks. New private banks and foreign banks are allowed to establish. Foreign investors
are allowed to hold up to 74% of private banks. At the same time ownership in public
sector banks is diversified with government shareholding reduced to 51% in many
banks. Currently, most of the state-owned banks in our sample have been listed in
Indian stock exchanges.
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To summarize, by 1996, banks operating in India, were, by and large, in a
position to take independent decisions on the composition of their asset portfolio, and
on the choice of potential borrowers. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
these banks, including the state-owned ones, allocated resources in a way that was
consistent with maximization of returns. 35 There are, however, significant differences
across credit market behaviour of banks of different ownership. Berger et al. (2008) find
that comparative advantage of Indian banks with respect to relationship with potential
borrowers varies considerably with ownership. State-owned banks typically have
banking relationship with small firms, state-owned firms and rural firms, domestic
private banks have comparative advantage with respect to opaque closely held firms,
and foreign banks have banking relationship with large, listed and foreign firms. The
likelihood of adverse selection, therefore, depends on ownership type. Bhaumik and
Piesse (2008) demonstrate that bank ownership also has an impact on risk aversion
among Indian banks, with foreign banks being significantly more risk averse than
domestic banks. Since the impact of monetary policy on bank lending depends in large
measure on the risk of adverse selection and the extent of risk aversion of banks, we
should expect to see considerable differences in the impact of such policy on banks of
different ownership.
2.2.

Monetary Policy

The authority to implement monetary policy in India rests with the RBI. It was
established under the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934, as a private shareholders’
35

The empirical literature on the Indian banking sector (e.g., Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004) suggests that
the public sector banks were responding to the changed policy and competition paradigm, and that, by the
end of the 1990s, ownership itself could no longer explain cross-sectional variations in profitability of
banks. Since catching up with the profitability and, conversely, cost efficiency, of the private sector and
foreign banks requires that the public sector banks be able to allocate their resources efficiently, there is
prima facie evidence to suggest that the public sector banks too are behaving as optimizing agents.
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bank, and was subsequently nationalised in 1949. Unlike the Bank of England, which
was formally granted independence in 1997, the RBI does not have de jure
independence from the Government of India. However, with the end of automatic
monetisation of fiscal deficit by 1997, the central bank was granted de facto
independence. There are strict limits on the ways and means advances by the RBI to the
government, and the former does not participate in primary market auctions of
government securities. While the RBI takes into account the federal government’s views
about the state of the economy, it de facto sets monetary policy independently.
Originally, the bank rate and open market operations were the RBI’s instruments
of choice for conducting monetary policy. In the seventies and eighties, with increased
accommodation of the federal government’s fiscal policies by the central bank, these
instruments lost their efficacy, and the cash reserve ratio (CRR) became the primary
instrument for conducting monetary policy. In 1998, in light of the realisation that in an
increasingly complex environment broad money supply in the medium term cannot be
the sole intermediate target of monetary policy, the RBI formally adopted a multifactor
approach to monetary policy. This resulted in a focus on the use of short term interest
rates as the instruments of monetary policy, facilitated by the deregulation of interest
rates, which was initiated as early as 1989. The bank rate, therefore, made a comeback
in 1997-98, and was complemented by the rates for reverse repo (and, from 2000-01,
repo) transactions. The repo and reverse repo rates have emerged as the primary
instruments of monetary policy since the turn of the century. The CRR, which was
reduced steadily from 15 percent in the early nineties to 5 percent by 2004, has not
completely been abandoned. It is still used in situations that demand significant
monetary response, or when other monetary policy options have been exhausted.
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Table 4.1
RBI monetary policy operations
Year

Bank rate (%)
1 April 31 March

REPO (%)a

CRR (%)
No. of

1 April 31 March

changes

No. of

1 April 31 March

changes

Reverse REPO (%)b
No. of

1 April

changes

31

No. of

March changes

1996-1997

12

12

0

14

10

7

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

1997-1998

12

10.5

5

10

10.25

5

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

4.5**

8

5

1998-1999

10.5

8

3

10.25

10.5

3

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

8

6

5

1999-2000

8

8

0

10.5

9

3

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

6

10

4

2000-2001

8

7

4

9

8

6

11.5%

9

6

10

6

5

2001-2002

7

6.5

1

8

5.5

3

9

8

5

6

5

6

2002-2003

6.5

6.25

1

5.5

4.75

2

8

7

4

5

4.5

1

2003-2004

6.25

6

1

4.75

4.5

1

6

6

1

4.5

4.75

1

2004-2005

6

6

0

4.5

5

3

6

6

0

4.75

4.75

0

2005-2006

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

5

5

1

6

6.5

2

4.75

5.5

3

2006-2007

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

5

5.5

1

6.5

7.75

5

5.5

6

2

Source: RBI Annual Reports
Note:

a

Started in June 2000

b

Started on 27 November 1997
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The use of all monetary policy instruments of the RBI are summarised in Table
4.1. It is evident that it is difficult to select any one instrument as the indicator of
monetary policy of the RBI. This poses a problem because empirical analysis requires
the use of a single monetary policy signal; the US literature on the lending channel of
monetary policy focuses on changes in the federal funds rate (Kashyap and Stein, 1995
& 2000), while the European literature uses short-term interest rates (Erhmann et al.,
2001) or the refinancing rate (Gambacorta, 2005). However, Indian banks declare their
respective prime lending rates (PLR) – the rate at which they are prepared to lend to the
most credit-worthy borrowers – that is linked to their cost of funds. The average PLR of
the five largest banks is quoted by the RBI. As shown in the Figure 4.1 in the Appendix,
movements of this average PLR closely replicates movements in the CRR, bank rate,
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also the repo and reverse repo rates 36. Hence, we use
the average PLR reported by the RBI as the basis for our measure of monetary policy.
We are not alone in our use of such constructs as the basis for the measure for monetary
policy. In the British context, Huang (2003) used the average of the base rates of
selected banks as the indicator of monetary policy, while Hofmann and Mizen (2004)
eschewed the official Bank of England rate in favour of the average of the base rates of
four major clearing banks.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the traditional IS-LM model, a reduction in money supply is immediately
translated into a higher equilibrium interest rate in the money market, and this in turn
affects the real sector through a reduction in investment. On a bank’s balance sheet, a

36

The coefficients of correlation between the PLR and the CRR, bank rate and repo rate are 0.94, 0.97
and 0.56 respectively.
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reduction in deposits on the liability side is matched by a reduction in the bank’s
holding of bonds and loans on the asset side. If bonds and loans are perfect substitutes,
as in the traditional Keynesian framework, there would be proportionate reduction in the
bonds and loans portfolios. The impact of monetary policy on the asset composition of
the banks (and the firms, the borrowers) is of no interest.
Now, suppose that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes. For example, at
least some of the banks might find it easier to both build up and unwind their loan
portfolios than their bond portfolios. In the presence of such imperfections in capital
market access, a contractionary monetary policy is likely to be followed by a much
greater reduction in loan supply than in sale of (or a drop in the demand for) bonds. 37
The literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission takes this
change in the asset composition of banks into consideration.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there can be considerable cross-sectional
variation in the nature of bank’s reaction to monetary policy. Banks with strong
linkages with their corresponding borrower pools, with resultant amelioration of the
informational asymmetry and hence credit risk, might downsize (or reduce the growth
of) their loan portfolios less in response to contractionary monetary policy than other
banks. On the other hand, less capitalised banks and smaller banks that find it more
difficult to raise capital might cut back on lending (or reduce lending growth) far more
than larger and well-capitalised banks. Since these cross-sectional variations affect only
the supply side of the loan market – the banks and not the firms that demand credit –

37

Alternatively, if bonds are safer than loans, which is often the case in developing countries where the
main issuer of bonds are the sovereign governments, a monetary contraction initiated by a central bank
might trigger a flight to the less risky asset, with banks downsizing their loans portfolios much more
aggressively than their bonds portfolios (Bernanke et al., 1994; Ashcraft and Campello, 2002). This is the
so-called balance sheet channel of monetary transmission that, together with the bank lending channel,
comprises the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.
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they can be used to circumvent identification problem of empirical modelling of the
bank lending channel, i.e., distinguishing between the demand and supply side effects of
monetary policy on the amount of loans disbursed.
In keeping with the literature, the theoretical basis for which can be found in
Ehrman et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we model change in loans
disbursed by bank i (yi) as a function of the change in the monetary policy instrument
(MP) – the average PLR of the five largest Indian banks in our case. Given the
aforementioned cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ response to monetary policy
based on their characteristics, we control for three different bank characteristics in our
specification, namely, liquidity (LIQ), capitalisation (CAP) and profitability (PROFIT).
This is consistent with the stylised literature (Gambacorta, 2005). In light of the
evidence that suggests that bank behaviour in India can be affected by being subjected
to market scrutiny (see Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), we also include in our specification
a dummy variable (LISTING) that takes the value 1 if a bank is listed at one of the
country’s stock exchanges. Finally, in order to further facilitate identification to
distinguish between loan demand and loan supply, we include industrial growth (IND)
that affects the demand for funds much more than banks’ behaviour. 38
Our base specification, therefore, is as follows:

∆yit = α + β∆MPt-1 + γ1∆CAPi,t-1 + γ2∆LIQi,t-1 + γ3PROFITi,t-1 + γ4LISTINGi,t
+ γ5INDt-1 + µi + εit

(4.1)

38

In the literature, the controls for loan demand usually are GDP growth rate and the inflation rate,
sometimes used together in the specification. However, there is evidence to suggest that in the Indian
context bank’s behaviour is influenced more by industrial growth than by GDP growth (Bhaumik and
Piesse, 2008), and hence our choice. We also experimented with specifications that included the inflation
rate, in isolation as well as together with the industrial growth rate. The coefficient of inflation was never
significant, and hence we do not report that specification in the thesis.
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where t represents time, i the index of bank, µi is the bank-specific fixed effect and εit is
the i.i.d. error term. In the literature, bank lending models are usually estimated using
quarterly data. Since a change in monetary policy in quarter t is likely to affect disbursal
in bank loans with at least a one-period lag, ∆yit is modelled as a function of monetary
policy in the previous four quarters. However, in the Indian context, only annual data
are available for banks, such that the time unit of analysis is a year, as opposed to a
quarter. Therefore, we assume that a change in monetary policy in a given year will
affect loans disbursal of the following year. Hence, we model ∆yit as a function of

∆MPi,t-1, the lagged change in the monetary policy indicator.
Our empirical approach is different from the literature in several ways. Since our
study focuses on the differences in the reactions of banks with different ownership to
monetary policy, we interact bank ownership dummies with ∆MPi,t-1. Second, we argue
that a given change in interest rates cannot have the same impact in a tight and an easy
monetary regime; a 50 basis point increase in the interest is likely to have a very
different impact on loan disbursal when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 8
percent, compared to the case when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 2
percent. Hence, we further interact the ∆MPi,t-1 variable with an indicator of the nature
of the monetary regime. In other words, our regression estimates identify the impact of
monetary policy on loan disbursal for banks of each ownership type, in each monetary
regime. In order to facilitate this process further, following Huang (2003), we include
interactions between ∆MPi,t-1 and indicators of both of these type of regimes: a dummy
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variable MCI that takes the value 1 in an easy monetary regime, and its inverse IMCI
that takes the value 1 in a tight monetary regime 39.
The resultant specification is as follows:

∆yit = Σjαj(IMCIt-1 × ∆MPt-1 × OWNjit) + Σjβj(MCIt-1 × ∆MPt-1 × OWNjit) + γ1∆CAPi,t-1 +
γ2∆LIQi,t-1 + γ3PROFITi,t-1 + γ4LISTINGit + γ5INDt-1 + µi + εit

(4.2)

where OWN is a dummy variable capturing type of bank ownership and j is the index of
the types of bank ownership.
This equation represents a collection of baseline equations that are estimated for
each bank group in each monetary regime while setting dummies for other bank groups
to zero. So if the coefficient αj of IMCIt-1× ∆MPi,t-1×OWNjit is negative it means when
the last period regime is tight banks of that ownership type j would lower their lending
if there was an increase in last period monetary indicator MP. Similarly, if the
coefficient βj of MCIt-1×∆MPt-1×OWNjit is negative it means when the last period regime
is easy banks of ownership type j would decrease their lending if MP rate increased in
the past period.
The data for the estimation are obtained from a number of sources. Bank balance
sheets are obtained from the Indian Banks’ Association. Using these financial
statements, we are able to measure the change in loan disbursal by each bank during
each financial year (∆yit). We measure CAP as the log of capital and reserves, LIQ as
the log of liquid assets, and PROFIT as the return on assets. The information about year
of stock exchange listing of banks is obtained from the Prowess database marketed by

39

This approach is also used by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) to estimate the asymmetric effect of cash
flow on investment in a monetary tightening and by Vermeulen (2000) to estimate the additional financial
accelerator effect in periods of recessions.
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the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The ownership types of the banks 40 –
public sector, old domestic private, new domestic private, and foreign – are obtained
from the RBI. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the central bank is also the source for
our measure of monetary policy. We measure ∆MPit as the change in the yearly average
of the aforementioned PLR. Finally, the indicators of easy and tight monetary regime
are obtained from the monetary conditions index (MCI) estimated by Kannan et al.
(2006).
An MCI is a weighted average of the change in the domestic interest rates and
exchange rates relative to their values on a pre-specified base date. The weights could
be derived from empirical economic models that estimate the impact of these variables
on either aggregate demand or prices. When the MCI is positive (negative) the monetary
condition is said to be tight (easy). While there are doubts about the use of MCIs as an
operational tool it is widely accepted that MCIs can serve as an important indicator of
monetary stance (Hyder and Khan, 2007; Kannan et al., 2006). According to the
Kannan et al.’ (2006) estimation the weights of interest rate and exchange rate are equal
0.58 and 0.42 respectively, suggesting a more important role of interest rate for the
macroeconomic environment. This MCI turns out to explain the monetary policy
environment better than either interest rate or exchange rate does independently when
matched with actual past macroeconomic episodes of the Indian economy.

40

The nature of public sector (or state-owned) and foreign banks are easily understood, even though it
should be noted that private investors own minority shares in a number of public sector banks. The
distinction between the two types of domestic private banks is more complex. The old domestic private
banks were in operation much before the initiation of the financial reforms in the early 1990s. They were
typically closely held, often by members of trading communities. Subsequent to the reforms, many of
these banks have floated themselves on stock exchanges and have expanded beyond their traditional
geographical enclaves. The new private banks came into existence after the financial reforms paved the
way for market entry for new banks. Many of them have links to large former or existing non-bank
financial institutions. These de novo banks by and large have professional management, almost always
are stock exchange listed, and have expanded their shares of the deposit and loans markets aggressively.
For further details, see Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) and Bhaumik and Dimova (2004).
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Following Bhaumik and Piesse (2008), we include in our sample banks with at
least two branches. This primarily leads to exclusion of foreign banks that have a sole
branch in India to finance trading activities of their respective client multinationals. We
also exclude from our sample banks that experienced very large changes to their balance
sheets, often on account of acquisition of non-banking assets of other financial
organisations, or on account of financial distress. Our final sample consists of 58 banks,
and the data covers the 2000-07 period, resulting in over 300 bank-year observations
(we lose one year of data due to lagging). Of these banks, 24 are public sector banks, 21
are old private sector banks, 3 are new private sector banks and 10 are foreign banks.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression model are reported in Table
4.2.
In general, Indian public banks are much larger than private banks. Indian public
banks’ lending grows faster than that of private banks but private banks’ lending growth
under tight regime is higher than their lending growth under easy regime. Term-wise
speaking, Indian private banks make relatively more short-term advances than public
banks.
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Table 4.2
Summary statistics by bank ownership and monetary regime
Variable

Public banks

Private banks

All

Easy

Tight

All

Easy

Tight

Mean

52846.43

57588.06

49290.21

7834.33

8675.76

7216

Std. Dev.

75552.61

80082.95

72190.76

8978.79

9257.59

8752.08

Mean

2712.99

2981.494

2511.611

564.76

654.084

498.44

Std. Dev.

3822.872

4022.267

3674.706

772.78

811.65

738.74

Mean

22302.41

25337.98

20025.74

2713.12

3130.53

2412.71

Std. Dev.

35251.67

39345.45

31863.85

2905.52

3109.8

2721.66

Mean

23474.7

25374.02

22050.21

3719.32

4142.14

3408.61

Std. Dev.
Mean

32289.41
26117.14

31536.51
28077.81

32934.94
24646.65

4422.98
4243.66

4466.68
4745.03

4381.54
3875.23

Std. Dev.

34877.7

34350.24

35375.83

4945.26

5222.77

4717.16

Mean

8926.752

9535.028

8423.351

1943.48

2187.42

1750.68

Std. Dev.

12004.92

12821.93

11334.99

2382.46

2630.69

2157.79

Mean

8206.04

8555.75

7916.62

1093.68

1121.28

1071.86

Std. Dev.

11223.34

9452.559

12548.61

1435.51

1343.57

1509.26

Mean

0.96

1.13

0.832

1.1

0.794

1.32

Std. Dev.

0.78

0.378

0.969

1.88

1.845

1.89

Mean

0.65

0.750

0.583

0.64

0.65

0.64

Std. Dev.

0.48

0.436

0.496

0.48

0.48

0.48

Mean

0.197

0.201

0.193

0.157

0.132

0.175

Std. Dev.
Mean

0.118
0.183

0.136
0.179

0.104
0.185

0.196
0.140

0.195
0.111

0.195
0.161

Std. Dev.

0.127

0.145

0.112

0.193

0.189

0.193

Mean

0.189

0.167

0.213

0.140

0.129

0.149

Std. Dev.

0.212

0.187

0.237

0.324

0.321

0.328

Mean

0.190

0.188

0.193

0.102

0.012

0.177

Std. Dev.

0.266

0.204

0.325

0.631

0.669

0.589

Mean

0.152

0.175

0.134

0.159

0.150

0.166

Std. Dev.

0.143

0.157

0.129

0.186

0.196

0.179

Mean

0.103

0.126

0.086

0.091

0.078

0.100

Level and ratio
Total assets

Capital and reserves

Liquid assets

Advances

Advances, debentures
and bonds

Short-term advances

Medium-term advances

ROA (%)

Listing on stock
exchanges

Growth
Δ log of advances
Δ log of advances,
debentures and bonds
Δ log of short-term
advances
Δ log of medium-term
advances
Δ log of capital and
reserves

Δ log of liquid assets

Std. Dev.
0.131
0.107
0.144
0.238
0.250
0.228
All level variables are in Indian rupee crores (10 millions). Liquid assets include cash, balances with RBI and other banks, money
at call and short notice, government and other approved securities. Short-term means less than 1 year and medium-term means
from 1 year up to 3 years.
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We start our empirical exercise by estimating the baseline equation for all banks
with no regard for monetary regime. This equation is normally conducted by the
random effect (RE) or fixed effect (FE) methods but the FE method is more popular
because the assumption of no correlation between the unobserved effect and
explanatory variables that underlies the RE method is often seen as unrealistic.
Therefore, we use the FE method in this chapter to obtain consistent
estimates 41. Unfortunately, the estimation for the pooled data (i.e. banks of all type and
no regime discrimination) does not yield any significant coefficients with very small Fstatistic. This means that it is we cannot build a model for a sample of banks that are
very heterogeneous and for both easy and tight monetary regimes. Therefore, we
proceed by estimating equation (4.2).
When money regime is tight we expect that all banks will reduce their lending in
the following year if there is a further tightening. In other words, we expect all the αs to
be negative. However, in easy money regime a rate increase may not necessarily result
in contraction of lending across the board. Some banks may have more customers who
are refused by other banks. Some may have more available funds for lending thanks to
expansionary monetary policy in previous years. In general, we cannot tell a priori the
sign of the βs.

41

We do use RE estimation but it does not detect unobserved effect while FE estimation does. We also
try to estimate a dynamic panel model with the lag of log change of advances as an explanatory variable
but it is never significant even though GMM assumptions are satisfied by Sargan/Hansen tests.
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Table 4.3
Fixed effect estimation – determinants of credit disbursal (I)
Dependent variable: log change in
advances
All banks State-owned
Private
sector
(1)
(2)
(3)

Dependent variable: log change in
advances and debentures
All banks
StatePrivate
owned
sector
(4)
(5)
(6)

Tight money regime
Rate change x Public
Rate change x Old private
Rate change x New private
Rate change x Foreign

-0.136***

-0.133***

-0.104**

-0.119**

(0.049)

(0.043)

(0.047)

(0.045)

-0.046

-0.07

-0.042

-0.049

(0.048)

(0.054)

(0.044)

(0.054)

-0.069

-0.096

-0.111

-0.122

(0.186)

(0.196)

(0.149)

(0.165)

-0.383***

-0.399***

-0.32***

-0.324***

(0.082)

(0.088)

(0.093)

(0.102)

Easy regime
Rate change x Public
Rate change x Old private
Rate change x New private
Rate change x Foreign

0.078

0.049

0.153*

0.174

(0.059)

(0.058)

(0.081)

(0.104)

0.146**

0.169**

0.165***

0.169**

(0.058)

(0.067)

(0.056)

(0.067)

0.1

0.063

0.054

0.012

(0.277)

(0.242)

(0.217)

(0.19)

0.06

0.119

0.096

0.127

(0.138)

(0.133)

(0.144)

(0.137)

Control variables
Capital (lagged)
Liquidity (lagged)
Return on assets (lagged)
Stock exchange listing
Industrial growth (lagged)
F-statistic
Prob(F-stat>0)
R-square

-0.09

-0.434

0.094

-0.095

-0.417

0.054

(0.137)

(0.255)

(0.076)

(0.131)

(0.245)

(0.09)

-0.059

-0.02

-0.066

-0.042

0.015

-0.053

(0.059)

(0.108)

(0.065)

(0.054)

(0.117)

(0.059)

0.056**

0.026

0.055**

0.054**

0.065

0.052**

(0.025)

(0.05)

(0.026)

(0.024)

(0.053)

(0.025)

-0.008

0.009

0.025

0.011

0.024

0.033

(0.023)

(0.026)

(0.042)

(0.023)

(0.021)

(0.05)

0.04***

0.046***

0.044***

0.036***

0.043***

0.036***

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.012)

(0.008)

(0.009)

(0.013)

5.97

11.19

2.95

4.43

5

7.74

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.28

0.34

0.32

0.23

0.26

0.28

No. of observations
334
144
190
334
144
190
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.3 shows estimation results when two measures of loan supply are used:
advances (log change) and total advances, debentures and bonds (log change). Columns
(1) and (4) are results of regressions of all banks; columns (2) and (5) are results of
regressions of only public banks; and columns (3) and (6) are results of regressions of
private banks only. The F-statistics show that the model as represented by the equation
(4.2) fits the data well.
In general, when the regime is tight it seems that all banks reduce their lending.
We have negative α as expected for all bank types and they are significant for public
and foreign banks. The coefficient α of foreign banks is much larger than that of the
public banks. So, the Indian public banks are more responsive to policy shocks than
domestic private banks but less so than foreign banks. This result is the same for both
measures of lending.
This result seems to be in contrast with the Micco and Panizza’s (2006) result
where public banks in a group of both developed and developing countries are less
responsive to macroeconomic shocks than private banks. However, these private banks
are both domestic and foreign owned. In addition, our result is just for period of tight
monetary regime. The strong reaction of foreign banks suggests that they are more riskaverse than local banks. In addition, foreign banks often have disadvantages in
obtaining and processing information about opaque firms (Stein, 2002) and they have
less room in terms of customer base to cushion adversary shocks 42. Foreign banks
usually depend more on money market and funds from mother banks. In fact in 2006-07
the average credit-deposit ratio of the foreign banks in the sample is 105.9% while those
of public banks and domestic private banks (both old and new) are 65% and 61.8%
42

Berger et al. (2008) show that foreign banks in India tend to establish relationship with more
transparent firms, mainly foreign and large local ones.
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respectively. In the face of monetary tightening foreign banks often do not have
relatively cheap working fund in form of deposits obtained from previous periods.
Consequently, they have to cut back credits more sharply than domestic banks.
In easy money regime, banks expand their business. When interest rate is raised
banks may significantly cut back their lending or go on to supply credit if they have
relatively cheap funds obtained from previous periods or sources other than insured
deposits. In Table 12 we see that in easy regime when monetary condition is tightened
Indian banks either show no reactions or disburse more credit. All the coefficient βs are
positive and they are significant for old private sector banks and public banks (in model
(4), though not really strongly). In other words, public and old private sector banks still
supply more credit when they face monetary contraction given that the previous period
regime is easy.
There can be several explanations for this result. It may reflect the expectations
about future state of market by old private banks and, to some extent, public sector
banks. In easy money regime banks would expect an increase in interest rate to be
temporary and they would expand their businesses in preparation for the future when
conditions become favourable again. There may be some sort of strategic market
expansion activities among the banks. When new private sector banks and foreign banks
are following a kind of “wait and see” policy the public sector banks and old private
banks may be more aggressive in credit disbursal in order to capture more market share.
Another possible explanation is that old private banks have special relationship with
their clients which are not affected by monetary policy shocks. One may argue that
public sector banks are under some pressure to maintain the level of credit supply to
their clients but this cannot explain why they supply substantially less credit PLR
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increases and the previous regime is tight. This is clearly pointing to an asymmetric
effect of monetary policy on bank lending. The result here shows some counteraction by
old private and public banks against monetary shocks and it calls into question the
effectiveness of monetary policy in easy monetary regime. Given that banks of different
ownership types have different clienteles it should follow from the results here that
monetary policies would have asymmetric effects across firms as well.
Of the control variables, capital and liquidity have no effect on credit growth.
However, return on assets is positive and significant across estimations except for data
of public banks only, which means profit is an important determinant of credit supply of
Indian banks. As expected, industrial growth has positive and significant effect on credit
supply and the effect is similar for different bank types and measures.
Table 4.4 presents estimation results when we use log change of short term (up
to one year) and medium term (from one up to three years) advances as dependent
variables. In general, we have similar pattern of banks’ response to monetary shocks in
terms of short-term and medium-term credit supply. Under tight regime, public and
foreign banks reduce short-term and medium-term lending significantly while domestic
private banks do not. Foreign banks’ response is two to three times stronger than that of
public banks, depending on the term of credit: they cut back on medium-term credit
much more than short-term credit. This can be considered an evidence of riskaverseness. In difficult time, banks prefer short term advances over those of longer term
for fear of future uncertainty.
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Table 4.4
FE estimation – determinants of credit disbursal (II)
Dependent variable: log change in
short term advances
All banks
StatePrivate
owned
sector

Dependent variable: log change in
medium term advances
All banks State-owned Private sector
(4)

(5)

-0.22*

-0.3**

-0.069

(0.116)

(0.145)

(0.133)

(1)

(2)

-0.171
(0.111)

(3)

(6)

Tight money regime
Rate change x Public
Rate change x Old private
Rate change x New private
Rate change x Foreign

-0.092

-0.078

-0.194

-0.353

(0.124)

(0.153)

(0.2)

(0.26)

0.13

0.141

-0.391

-0.539

(0.317)

(0.329)

(0.422)

(0.443)

-0.348***

-0.336**

-1.02***

-1.15***

(0.123)

(0.14)

(0.345)

(0.347)

Easy regime
Rate change x Public
Rate change x Old private
Rate change x New private
Rate change x Foreign

0.142

0.253*

0.367**

0.105

(0.095)

(0.136)

(0.158)

(0.201)

0.326**

0.307*

0.287

0.446

(0.164)

(0.173)

(0.343)

(0.371)

-0.081

-0.088

0.614

0.623

(0.272)

(0.291)

(0.522)

(0.48)

-0.15

-0.141

0.552

0.721

(0.449)

(0.514)

(0.733)

(0.784)

Control variables
Capital (lagged)

-0.008

-0.216

0.018

0.305

0.227**

0.6

(0.142)

(0.186)

(0.222)

(0.265)

(0.096)

(0.408)

0.02

-0.093

0.031

-0.472**

-0.077

-0.517*

(0.08)

(0.212)

(0.08)

(0.225)

(0.209)

(0.256)

0.062**

0.19*

0.058**

-0.027

-0.164

-0.015

(0.024)

(0.125)

(0.024)

(0.03)

(0.151)

(0.028)

-0.051

0.039

-0.2

0.003

-0.298*

0.6

(0.11)

(0.05)

(0.249)

(0.248)

(0.155)

(0.416)

0.031**

0.032*

0.029

0.081**

0.045*

0.115**

(0.016)

(0.019)

(0.029)

(0.031)

0.029

(0.052)

F-statistic

2.09

2.78

2.03

3.99

2.39

4.47

Prob(F-stat>0)

0.03

0.03

0.057

0

0.054

0

Pseudo R-square

0.1

0.09

0.1

0.1

0.09

0.15

Liquidity (lagged)
Return on assets (lagged)
Stock exchange listing
Industrial growth (lagged)

No. of observations
319
135
184
319
135
184
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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In easy regime we also obtain results similar to those of total advances
regressions. State-owned banks lend more in both short term and medium term even
though interest rate increases in previous period. However, old private banks only
supply more short term loans in easy regime, perhaps because it is less risky than
expanding medium-term loans.
Concerning control variables in Table 13, one point which is noteworthy is that
banks’ responses to industrial growth are much higher for medium term credit than for
short-term credit. This is line with the fact that medium term advances are mostly
provided to manufacturing firms as working capital.

5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION
In this chapter we analyze the effect of ownership on bank lending under
different monetary regimes in the context of an important emerging economy. This
empirical exercise has shown that banks of different types respond very differently to
monetary policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public and foreign
banks cut back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to
be affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy some
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of
monetary tightening.
In general the results support the existence of a bank lending channel in India
but it is a peculiar one. It can either reinforce or attenuate, or even counteract the
traditional effect of monetary policies. Public banks have been found to play a
smoothing role in general (Micco and Panizza, 2006) but it is necessary to distinguish
their responses under different regimes. The result of this chapter shows that Indian
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public banks, following important reforms, are very active in responding to monetary
shocks in under different monetary regimes.
The chapter has shown evidence of asymmetry of the effect of monetary policy
on bank lending. When previous period regime is tight banks respond negatively to
monetary shocks but when previous period regime is easy they do not respond or do so
positively to monetary shocks.
Finally, the results of this chapter further stress the need to take careful
consideration of the ownership structure of the banking system when policy measures
are prescribed. Moreover, existing monetary environment should also be an important
factor to be considered due to the asymmetric effect of monetary policy. As for many
transition economies in Eastern Europe where the percentage of assets in banks with
majority foreign ownership is high (Bonin et al., 2005) the findings of this chapter
should warrant some extra attention for the conduct of monetary policy because foreign
banks are much more responsive to monetary tightening than domestic banks.

104

Chapter V

Conclusions

CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS
Institutions determine the incentive structure of an economy and, in turn, the
structure shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation or decline
(North, 1991). Institutions create the favourable environment for division of labour,
specialization and trade to take place, thus generating growth. Since the 1990s the role
of institutions has been evaluated in many empirical studies and the literature is still
expanding fast.
The collapse of the planned economic system in former socialist countries and
their reforms toward market economy have offered a good socio-economic experiment
for us to study the effect of institutions for the purpose of further understanding
institutions and possibly offering guidance for future reform steps in transition countries
in particular and others that are also striving to achieve economic growth and prosperity
in general.
This thesis has tried to examine the effect of institutions in transition economies
in three directions: efficiency, investment and credit supply by banks. In general, the
thesis finds positive effect of institutions on efficiency and investment rates in transition
economies. It also shows that different ownerships of banks have significantly different
effects on credit supply by banks.
With regard to efficiency, the thesis shows that higher quality of institutions,
both economic and political, is associated with higher efficiency in transition
economies. This result is robust to different rates of depreciation that are used to
estimate the capital series for these countries. This result is in line with other studies in
different context (Kaufmann et al. 1999; Meon and Weill, 2005). So far the empirical
result about the effect of political freedom on economic performance has been mixed
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but this empirical study shows that it does have significant role in improving efficiency,
at least in the context of transition economies. Of course institutions do not solely
determine efficiency but improvement of institutional quality should help transition
economies to gain higher efficiency. This thesis also shows that for transition
economies the translog production function is more appropriate for estimating
efficiency than the usual Cobb-Douglas production function.
Investment is the vehicle of growth and efficiency. Without investment, growth
cannot be sustained. More importantly, investment is the channel of “creative
destruction” that both raises production capacity and improves efficiency. This thesis
shows that institutional factors play a significant role in explaining investment
differences, therefore positively affecting growth. In general, higher degree of both
economic and political freedoms is associated with higher rate of investment to GDP
ratio. However, it should be stressed that one aspect of economic institution alone
would not make much difference. It is the overall bettering of the economic institutions
that matter in inducing investment. As far as political freedom is concerned both
political rights and civil liberties are important in promoting investment through the
effect of political rights is stronger than that of civil liberties. In addition, this thesis
shows that those who are ahead in the transition process have higher investment rate,
especially with regard to large scale privatization.
On the effect of ownership on bank lending the thesis finds that banks’ loan
supply is asymmetric in the sense that, for some bank groups (public and foreignowned), it is significantly cut down in a tight monetary regime but not so in an easy
regime. In addition, banks of different types respond very differently to monetary
policies in different monetary regimes. In easy regime, public and foreign banks cut
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back on lending when monetary tightening happens but others do not seem to be
affected. On the contrary, when the state of the monetary environment is easy they
either do not respond (new private and foreign banks) or increase lending in the face of
monetary tightening. In other words, ownership makes a difference in terms of loan
supply by banks for a given monetary policy and monetary condition and the ownership
structure of the banking system plays a role in determining the effectiveness of
monetary policy in an economy that is a process of transition from a public-dominated
system to a more liberalized and competitive system.
The thesis has several weaknesses. First, the measure of institutions is open to
criticism because of subjectivity and imprecision. Second, the causal relationship
between institutions and efficiency and investment rates are is not tested. The third is
that the case of India might not represent the situation in many other developing and
transition economies. However, we believe this thesis can serve as additional evidence
in support of building high quality institutions for economic performance and as
encouragement for transition and developing countries to step up their reforms toward
better functioning of their market economies.

107

APPENDIX
1. TABLES
Table A2.1
Estimation result with Political Rights and Civil Liberties
with translog production function
Translog without regional dummy
PR

Translog with EA dummy

CL

PR

CL

Production frontier
Constant

6.33** (1.91)

6.45 (1.81)

9.69*** (3.19)

11.48 (3.77)

k

-0.34 (-1.3)

-0.29 (-1.13)

-0.64** (-2.63)

-0.74 (-3.06)

l

136*** (7.08)

1.29*** (6.92)

1.41*** (8.86)

1.33 (8.07)

k2

0.03*** (30.1)

0.03*** (30.38)

0.03*** (30.8)

0.03 (29.17)

l2

-0.02 (-1.17)

-0.01 (-0.93)

-0.03** (-2.48)

-0.04** (-2.72)

kl

-0.02 (-1.26)

-0.02 (-1.38)

-0.002 (-0.13)

0.005 (0.28)

time

-0.02*** (-4.2)

-0.02*** (-4.93)

-0.02*** (-4.01)

-0.02*** (-5.16)

Constant

-30.7*** (-21.8)

-33.87*** (-18.49)

-32.1*** (-20.63)

-35.97*** (-18.52)

COMP1

1.89*** (10.41)

1.05*** (5.65)

1.14*** (4.01)

0.23 (1.51)

COMP2

3.7*** (7.6)

2.45*** (5.17)

2.1*** (4.6)

0.47 (1.59)

PR

1.2** (2.94)

-

2.69*** (5.1)

-

CL

-

3.3*** (9.92)

EA dummy

-

-

-13.49*** (-5.16)

-17.15*** (-11.8)

time

1.7*** (10.21)

1.13*** (10.23)

1.04*** (4.15)

0.69*** (8.2)

σ2

12.72***

10.84*** (8.7)

12.73*** (13.35)

10.3*** (11.02)

0.99***

0..99***

0.99*** (3837.9)

0.99*** (2688.5)

(3495.8)

(3685.64)

Log likelihood

-202.18

-184.48

-193.74

-168.59

Likelihood ratio test

832.96

868.36

849.85

900.15

Efficiency effects

4.72*** (12.67)

(12.42)
γ

T-ratios are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Higher
COMP1, COMP2 and FHI mean less freedom.
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Table A2.2
Translog production function with 10% and 6% depreciation rates, and with China
(CHN) and Cambodia-Vietnam (CBD_VN) dummies

10% depreciation

6% depreciation

Constant

11.11*** (3.8)

47.28*** (47.51)

k

-0.73*** (-3.47)

-2.22*** (-27.04)

l

1.36*** (8.02)

-0.72** (-3.46)

k2

0.03** (30.61)

0.021*** (34.8)

2

l

-0.04** (-3.15)

-0.07*** (-5.2)

kl

0.004 (0.26)

0.12** (2.04)

time

-0.026*** (-3.76)

-0.04*** (-68.6)

Constant

-33.41*** (-28.54)

-10.27*** (-12.47)

COMP1

0.92*** (7.18)

0.58*** (5.24)

COMP2

1.7*** (5.73)

2.79*** (8.71)

FHI

3.59*** (14.99)

1.52*** (9.95)

CHN

-20.61** (-3.27)

-1.91*** (-4.09)

CBD_VN

-14.81*** (-12.53)

-5.19*** (-5.9)

time

0.87*** (9.33)

0.31** (3.3)

σ2

12.26*** (13.26)

3.97*** (22)

γ

0.99*** (2966.5)

0.99 (0.98E+8)

Log likelihood

-182.29

-427.82

Likelihood ratio test

871.4

382.57

Production frontier

Efficiency effect

T-ratios are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** means significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.

Higher COMP1, COMP2 and FHI mean less freedom.
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Table A3.1
Transition economies and averages of variables used in the regressions (1990-2007)

Country

Investment1 IEF2

FHI EBRD Growth Saving1 Openness M31 Inflation Interest Government
rate consumption1

Albania

20.34

56.20 3.72

3.64

2.813

-5.979

59.70

61.64 29.58

0.04

12.07

Armenia

22.43

61.70 4.15

3.39

3.757

0.703

80.13

21.10 375.50

20.27

12.50

Azerbaijan

29.46

48.21 5.44

2.91

3.778 23.109

92.35

21.01 232.01

8.4

15.12

Belarus

25.51

41.00 5.59

2.06

2.776 23.464

122.54 19.83 338.90

-28.81

20.27

Bulgaria

17.99

53.66 2.11

3.55

0.775 13.786

108.89 57.32 91.14

2.3

16.86

Cambodia

14.48

59.10 5.72

n.a.

8.571 5.1236

86.63

3.64

13.16

5.63

China

35.18

52.95 6.72

n.a.

9.983 42.542

47.42 126.74 5.76

2.03

14.97

Croatia
Czech
Republic

21.50

51.81 3.06

3.96

1.373 14.233

103.15 50.14 137.14

9.4

24.22

27.57

67.86 1.47

4.01

2.021 27.475

117.03 68.64

8.76

2.51

21.64

Estonia

26.84

73.28 1.68

3.84

2.702 24.419

151.71 41.16 71.65

-7.81

19.90

Georgia

20.60

55.60 4.06

3.38 -1.652 2.5051

79.67

12.24 1286.97 21.92

11.20

Hungary

21.62

61.26 1.47

4.06

1.793 23.065

110.38 48.73 14.54

4.34

10.64

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz
Republic

23.26

51.78 5.38

3.22

2.211 25.443

90.47

19.65 277.01

n.a.

12.29

16.39

56.09 4.65

3.62

0.027

4.902

85.55

17.74 117.84

23.15

19.25

Lao PDR

28.50

39.41 6.50

n.a.

6.42

17.881

60.53

15.99 23.74

8.68

7.77

Latvia

20.87

64.58 1.88

3.78

1.974 21.072

100.75 32.67 73.39

6.13

19.07

Lithuania

22.60

63.98 1.68

3.74

1.595 16.294

107.27 28.02 96.96

-0.64

18.85

Macedonia

17.35

58.63 3.25

3.88

0.482 7.0175

93.49

29.18 118.61

13.32

19.95

Moldova

19.14

54.47 3.68

3.24 -2.734

8.357

113.83 31.14 137.48

8.96

17.74

Mongolia

28.57

56.15 2.42

3.44

2.719 19.684

120.67 30.91 49.19

29.66

17.85
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19.90

58.94 1.53

4.10

3.942 19.315

58.36

39.23 16.18

7.55

19.45
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20.32

51.32 2.83
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1.205 16.267

64.11
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1.71
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19.76

51.61 4.38
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0.398

57.57

26.32 182.12
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28.57

60.27 1.89
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2.564 23.892
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5.64

21.70
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58.79 1.41

3.97

2.88

24.924

120.47 40.35 27.15

27.49

19.15

Tajikistan

14.94

47.35 5.88

2.78 -1.272

9.058

111.10

-1.61

12.47

Turkmenistan

33.21

43.02 6.89

1.66 -1.787 32.885

135.71 16.08 647.15

n.a.

13.39

Ukraine

21.68

47.67 3.47

2.91 -1.655 25.128

88.20

-4.56

19.41

Uzbekistan

26.48

40.51 6.56

2.30

59.28

n.a.

19.77

2.483

32.5

21.93

14.54

7.83 180.02
29.15 379.08
n.a.

220.74

29.14
44.35 6.72 N/A 7.509 21.745 104.74 48.05 15.36
6.37
7.23
Vietnam
1
2
as % of GDP; only available from 1995. Source: WBDI (2008), Heritage Foundation (2008), Freedom
House (2008) and EBRD Transition Index (2008).
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2. FIGURES
Figure 3.1: Fraser Institute's Index of Economic Freedom (19952007) and Freedom House Index (1990-2007)
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Figure 3.2: Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom Index, 2000-2006
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Figure 3.3: Growth rate of investment, 1992-2007
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Figure 3.4: Investment/GDP (%), 1990-2007
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Figure 3.5: Investment-growth in transition economies, 1995-2006
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Figure 4.1: Movement of prime lending rate and other policy rates
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